Bush intends to punish Moscow for invading Georgia

By JENNIFER LOVEN,

President Bush is poised to punish Moscow for its invasion of Georgia by canceling a once-celebrated deal for civilian nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and Russia.

With relations between the two nations in a nearly Cold Warlike freeze over Russia’s actions against its neighbor last month, planning is under way at the White House for the largely symbolic move by Bush, according to senior administration officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because the decision was not yet final. Action could come quickly, within days at the most, and officials see no need to wait until Vice President Dick Cheney returns next Wednesday from an overseas trip that includes stops in three former Soviet republics.

Withdrawing the agreement from Capitol Hill would have little actual impact, as the deal very likely would not gain approval during Bush’s presidency.

But taking the overt and public step of pulling it would be intended to send a message to Russia and the world that its actions in Georgia last month are not acceptable and will not go unanswered.

It would require a statement by Bush to Congress that the deal is “no longer in the national security interests” of the United States. A future president could reverse that and send the agreement back to Congress.

Signed in May by the two nations, the administration originally presented the deal as a landmark breakthrough.

It represented a significant reversal in policy for the U.S. on cooperation with Russia on nuclear issues. It would give the U.S. access to state-of-the-art Russian nuclear technology and clear the way for Russia to establish itself as a lucrative center for the import and storage of spent nuclear fuel from American-supplied reactors around the world. Such a deal was seen as crucial to boosting relations with Russia, and to fulfilling Bush’s vision of increasing civilian nuclear energy use worldwide as a way to combat rising energy demands and climate change.

But key lawmakers were suspicious of it even before the disastrous Russia-Georgia war.

Some feared it would undermine efforts to rein in Iran’s nuclear program, because of Russia’s extensive business and energy — including nuclear — ties with Tehran. That has so far prevented a move to approve the deal, and now there isn’t enough time left in the fall legislative calendar for the required review period to run out and have the agreement take effect without congressional action.

After years of tensions between Russia and Georgia, the recent fighting began Aug. 7 when Georgia’s military tried to re-establish control over its breakaway province of South Ossetia. Russia joined the battle, brutally repelled the Georgian offensive and then pushed deep into Georgia proper, where many of its forces remain.

Both sides signed a cease-fire, but Russia has ignored its requirement for all forces to return to prewar positions.

Administration officials determined almost immediately that Russia must suffer some consequences for its actions and wanted to take punitive measures in concert with Europe. But they have been frustrated at the lack of similar resolve among allies, who have offered condemnation of Russia but little else.

If Bush decides against pulling the deal, there are other penalty options available.

The administration could insist that Russia continue to be quietly left out of any discussions among the elite Group of Eight nations, essentially denying Russia membership in the club of major industrialized democracies without actually kicking it out.

The United States also could sell sophisticated anti-aircraft and anti-tank military hardware to Georgia.

A $1 billion economic recovery package for Georgia that Bush announced Wednesday — and which puts the tiny, impoverished nation in the top tier of U.S foreign aid recipients — does not include any military aid. But the U.S. had been helping the Georgian military modernize and U.S. officials have said it is likely that more military assistance will be forthcoming at some point to help the badly routed Georgian forces rebuild again.

Moscow has greeted such talk with anger, already accusing the U.S. of instigating or even helping Georgia make its ill-fated incursion into South Ossetia.

Among the most aggressive moves in Washington’s potential arsenal are withdrawing its support for Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization or trying to strip Russia of the right to host the 2014 Winter Olympics, now scheduled to be held in the Black Sea town of Sochi, near the border with Georgia. These options have been all but rejected as too harsh.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080904/ap_on_go_pr_wh/bush_russia

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US navy ship steams into port where Russian troops stationed

The USS Mount Whitney,  today made a controversial landing at the port of Poti
 

James Hider in Tbilisi

A US navy flagship has steamed into a Georgian port where Russian troops are still stationed, stoking tensions once again in the tinderbox Caucasus region.

A previous trip by American warships was cancelled at the last minute a week ago amid fears that an armed stand off could erupt in the Black Sea port of Poti.

The arrival of the USS Mount Whitney came as Moscow accused Dick Cheney, the hawkish US vice-president, of stoking tensions during a visit to Tbilisi yesterday, in which he vowed to bring Georgia into the Nato alliance. Russia sees any such move as a blatant Western encroachment on its traditional sphere of influence.

Russia’s leadership has already questioned whether previous US warships that docked at the port of Batumi, to the south, were delivering weapons to rearm the smashed Georgian military, something Washington has denied.

While Russia again questioned the deployment of what it described as “the number one ship of its type in the US navy” on the Black Sea, it said it planned no military action in response. The Russian Army has kept a small number of soldiers in Poti, where local Georgian officials accuse them of looting port authority buildings.

“Naval ships of that class can hardly deliver a large amount of aid,” said Andrei Nesterenko, a Russian foreign ministry spokesman. “Such ships of course have a hold for keeping provisions for the crew and items needed for sailing. How many dozens of tonnes of aid can a ship of that type deliver?”

He said the presence of US warships could contravene international conventions governing shipping on the Black Sea, and – in particular – restricting the entry of naval ships from countries that do not share a Black Sea coastline.

Militarily, the small Russian garrison in Poti would pose almost no threat to a vessel like the Mount Whitney, but the proximity of two hostile forces in such a fraught setting set the political temperature rising again in the Caucasus, a month after Russia’s five day war with Georgia.

The American warship is too large to actually enter the port, where Russia sunk several Georgian navy vessels in its offensive last month. Instead, it is expected anchor offshore and unload its cargo of blankets, hygiene kits, baby food and infant care supplies on to smaller boats.

“I can confirm it has arrived in Poti. Anchoring procedures are still ongoing but it has arrived,” said a US naval official.

Moscow, which followed up its crushing military defeat of Georgia by unilaterally recognising the independence of two of its breakaway regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, was fuming that Mr Cheney still insisted on Georgia’s entrance into the Atlantic alliance – something several key NATO members are wary of.

“The new promises to Tbilisi relating to the speedy membership of NATO simply strengthen the Saakashvili regime’s dangerous feeling of impunity and encourages its dangerous ambitions,” said Mr Nesterenko.

Washington has also pledged one billion dollars in aid to help Georgia rebuild after Russia pounded many of its military bases to dust and targeted important infrastructure.

The brief conflict has left thousands of Georgians homeless, including many driven from South Ossetia and the surrounding Russian buffer zone inside Georgia itself.

Georgian officials have accused the Russian-backed Ossetian militias of “ethnically cleansing” remote villages, while Moscow has charged Tbilisi with “genocide” for its heavy handed attack on the breakaway region last month.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4682003.ece

Russia Takes Strategic Advantage

From America’s War Against Islamic World

By: STRATFOR

The United States has been fighting a war in the Islamic world since 2001. Its main theaters of operation are in Afghanistan and Iraq, but its politico-military focus spreads throughout the Islamic world, from Mindanao to Morocco. The situation on Aug. 7, 2008, was as follows:

The war in Iraq was moving toward an acceptable but not optimal solution. The government in Baghdad was not pro-American, but neither was it an Iranian puppet, and that was the best that could be hoped for. The United States anticipated pulling out troops, but not in a disorderly fashion.
The war in Afghanistan was deteriorating for the United States and NATO forces. The Taliban was increasingly effective, and large areas of the country were falling to its control. Force in Afghanistan was insufficient, and any troops withdrawn from Iraq would have to be deployed to Afghanistan to stabilize the situation. Political conditions in neighboring Pakistan were deteriorating, and that deterioration inevitably affected Afghanistan.
The United States had been locked in a confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program , demanding that Tehran halt enrichment of uranium or face U.S. action. The United States had assembled a group of six countries (the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) that agreed with the U.S. goal, was engaged in negotiations with Iran, and had agreed at some point to impose sanctions on Iran if Tehran failed to comply. The United States was also leaking stories about impending air attacks on Iran by Israel or the United States if Tehran didn’t abandon its enrichment program. The United States had the implicit agreement of the group of six not to sell arms to Tehran, creating a real sense of isolation in Iran.

The Russian Resurgence
In short, the United States remained heavily committed to a region stretching from Iraq to Pakistan, with main force committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the possibility of commitments to Pakistan ( and above all to Iran ) on the table. U.S. ground forces were stretched to the limit, and U.S. airpower, naval and land-based forces had to stand by for the possibility of an air campaign in Iran — regardless of whether the U.S. planned an attack, since the credibility of a bluff depended on the availability of force.

The situation in this region actually was improving, but the United States had to remain committed there. It was therefore no accident that the Russians invaded Georgia on Aug. 8 following a Georgian attack on South Ossetia. Forgetting the details of who did what to whom, the United States had created a massive window of opportunity for the Russians: For the foreseeable future, the United States had no significant forces to spare to deploy elsewhere in the world, nor the ability to sustain them in extended combat. Moreover, the United States was relying on Russian cooperation both against Iran and potentially in Afghanistan, where Moscow’s influence with some factions remains substantial. The United States needed the Russians and couldn’t block the Russians. Therefore, the Russians inevitably chose this moment to strike.

On Sunday, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in effect ran up the Jolly Roger . Whatever the United States thought it was dealing with in Russia, Medvedev made the Russian position very clear. He stated Russian foreign policy in five succinct points, which we can think of as the Medvedev Doctrine (and which we see fit to quote here):

First, Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law.
Second, the world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.
Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible.
Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.
Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors.
Medvedev concluded, “These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy. As for the future, it depends not only on us but also on our friends and partners in the international community. They have a choice.”

The second point in this doctrine states that Russia does not accept the primacy of the United States in the international system. According to the third point, while Russia wants good relations with the United States and Europe, this depends on their behavior toward Russia and not just on Russia’s behavior. The fourth point states that Russia will protect the interests of Russians wherever they are — even if they live in the Baltic states or in Georgia, for example. This provides a doctrinal basis for intervention in such countries if Russia finds it necessary.

The fifth point is the critical one: “As is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.” In other words, the Russians have special interests in the former Soviet Union and in friendly relations with these states. Intrusions by others into these regions that undermine pro-Russian regimes will be regarded as a threat to Russia’s “special interests.”

Thus, the Georgian conflict was not an isolated event — rather, Medvedev is saying that Russia is engaged in a general redefinition of the regional and global system. Locally, it would not be correct to say that Russia is trying to resurrect the Soviet Union or the Russian empire. It would be correct to say that Russia is creating a new structure of relations in the geography of its predecessors, with a new institutional structure with Moscow at its center. Globally, the Russians want to use this new regional power — and substantial Russian nuclear assets — to be part of a global system in which the United States loses its primacy.

These are ambitious goals, to say the least. But the Russians believe that the United States is off balance in the Islamic world and that there is an opportunity here, if they move quickly, to create a new reality before the United States is ready to respond. Europe has neither the military weight nor the will to actively resist Russia. Moreover, the Europeans are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas supplies over the coming years, and Russia can survive without selling it to them far better than the Europeans can survive without buying it. The Europeans are not a substantial factor in the equation, nor are they likely to become substantial.

This leaves the United States in an extremely difficult strategic position. The United States opposed the Soviet Union after 1945 not only for ideological reasons but also for geopolitical ones. If the Soviet Union had broken out of its encirclement and dominated all of Europe, the total economic power at its disposal, coupled with its population, would have allowed the Soviets to construct a navy that could challenge U.S. maritime hegemony and put the continental United States in jeopardy. It was U.S. policy during World Wars I and II and the Cold War to act militarily to prevent any power from dominating the Eurasian landmass. For the United States, this was the most important task throughout the 20th century.

The U.S.-jihadist war was waged in a strategic framework that assumed that the question of hegemony over Eurasia was closed. Germany’s defeat in World War II and the Soviet Union’s defeat in the Cold War meant that there was no claimant to Eurasia, and the United States was free to focus on what appeared to be the current priority — the defeat of radical Islamism. It appeared that the main threat to this strategy was the patience of the American public, not an attempt to resurrect a major Eurasian power.

The United States now faces a massive strategic dilemma, and it has limited military options against the Russians. It could choose a naval option , in which it would block the four Russian maritime outlets, the Sea of Japan and the Black , Baltic and Barents seas. The United States has ample military force with which to do this and could potentially do so without allied cooperation, which it would lack. It is extremely unlikely that the NATO council would unanimously support a blockade of Russia, which would be an act of war.

But while a blockade like this would certainly hurt the Russians, Russia is ultimately a land power. It is also capable of shipping and importing through third parties, meaning it could potentially acquire and ship key goods through European or Turkish ports (or Iranian ports, for that matter). The blockade option is thus more attractive on first glance than on deeper analysis.

More important, any overt U.S. action against Russia would result in counteractions. During the Cold War, the Soviets attacked American global interest not by sending Soviet troops, but by supporting regimes and factions with weapons and economic aid. Vietnam was the classic example: The Russians tied down 500,000 U.S. troops without placing major Russian forces at risk. Throughout the world, the Soviets implemented programs of subversion and aid to friendly regimes, forcing the United States either to accept pro-Soviet regimes, as with Cuba, or fight them at disproportionate cost.

In the present situation, the Russian response would strike at the heart of American strategy in the Islamic world. In the long run, the Russians have little interest in strengthening the Islamic world — but for the moment, they have substantial interest in maintaining American imbalance and sapping U.S. forces. The Russians have a long history of supporting Middle Eastern regimes with weapons shipments, and it is no accident that the first world leader they met with after invading Georgia was Syrian President Bashar al Assad . This was a clear signal that if the U.S. responded aggressively to Russia’s actions in Georgia, Moscow would ship a range of weapons to Syria — and far worse, to Iran. Indeed, Russia could conceivably send weapons to factions in Iraq that do not support the current regime, as well as to groups like Hezbollah. Moscow also could encourage the Iranians to withdraw their support for the Iraqi government and plunge Iraq back into conflict. Finally, Russia could ship weapons to the Taliban and work to further destabilize Pakistan.

At the moment, the United States faces the strategic problem that the Russians have options while the United States does not. Not only does the U.S. commitment of ground forces in the Islamic world leave the United States without strategic reserve, but the political arrangements under which these troops operate make them highly vulnerable to Russian manipulation — with few satisfactory U.S. counters.

The U.S. government is trying to think through how it can maintain its commitment in the Islamic world and resist the Russian reassertion of hegemony in the former Soviet Union. If the United States could very rapidly win its wars in the region, this would be possible. But the Russians are in a position to prolong these wars, and even without such agitation, the American ability to close off the conflicts is severely limited. The United States could massively increase the size of its army and make deployments into the Baltics, Ukraine and Central Asia to thwart Russian plans, but it would take years to build up these forces and the active cooperation of Europe to deploy them. Logistically, European support would be essential — but the Europeans in general, and the Germans in particular, have no appetite for this war. Expanding the U.S. Army is necessary, but it does not affect the current strategic reality.

This logistical issue might be manageable, but the real heart of this problem is not merely the deployment of U.S. forces in the Islamic world — it is the Russians’ ability to use weapons sales and covert means to deteriorate conditions dramatically. With active Russian hostility added to the current reality, the strategic situation in the Islamic world could rapidly spin out of control.

The United States is therefore trapped by its commitment to the Islamic world. It does not have sufficient forces to block Russian hegemony in the former Soviet Union, and if it tries to block the Russians with naval or air forces, it faces a dangerous riposte from the Russians in the Islamic world. If it does nothing, it creates a strategic threat that potentially towers over the threat in the Islamic world.

The United States now has to make a fundamental strategic decision. If it remains committed to its current strategy, it cannot respond to the Russians. If it does not respond to the Russians for five or 10 years, the world will look very much like it did from 1945 to 1992. There will be another Cold War at the very least, with a peer power much poorer than the United States but prepared to devote huge amounts of money to national defense.

There are four broad U.S. options:

Attempt to make a settlement with Iran that would guarantee the neutral stability of Iraq and permit the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces there. Iran is the key here. The Iranians might also mistrust a re-emergent Russia, and while Tehran might be tempted to work with the Russians against the Americans, Iran might consider an arrangement with the United States — particularly if the United States refocuses its attentions elsewhere. On the upside, this would free the U.S. from Iraq. On the downside, the Iranians might not want —or honor — such a deal.
Enter into negotiations with the Russians, granting them the sphere of influence they want in the former Soviet Union in return for guarantees not to project Russian power into Europe proper. The Russians will be busy consolidating their position for years, giving the U.S. time to re-energize NATO . On the upside, this would free the United States to continue its war in the Islamic world. On the downside, it would create a framework for the re-emergence of a powerful Russian empire that would be as difficult to contain as the Soviet Union.
Refuse to engage the Russians and leave the problem to the Europeans . On the upside, this would allow the United States to continue war in the Islamic world and force the Europeans to act. On the downside, the Europeans are too divided, dependent on Russia and dispirited to resist the Russians. This strategy could speed up Russia’s re-emergence.

Rapidly disengage from Iraq, leaving a residual force there and in Afghanistan. The upside is that this creates a reserve force to reinforce the Baltics and Ukraine that might restrain Russia in the former Soviet Union. The downside is that it would create chaos in the Islamic world, threatening regimes that have sided with the United States and potentially reviving effective intercontinental terrorism. The trade-off is between a hegemonic threat from Eurasia and instability and a terror threat from the Islamic world.
We are pointing to very stark strategic choices. Continuing the war in the Islamic world has a much higher cost now than it did when it began, and Russia potentially poses a far greater threat to the United States than the Islamic world does. What might have been a rational policy in 2001 or 2003 has now turned into a very dangerous enterprise, because a hostile major power now has the option of making the U.S. position in the Middle East enormously more difficult.

If a U.S. settlement with Iran is impossible, and a diplomatic solution with the Russians that would keep them from taking a hegemonic position in the former Soviet Union cannot be reached, then the United States must consider rapidly abandoning its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and redeploying its forces to block Russian expansion. The threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War was far graver than the threat posed now by the fragmented Islamic world. In the end, the nations there will cancel each other out, and militant organizations will be something the United States simply has to deal with. This is not an ideal solution by any means, but the clock appears to have run out on the American war in the Islamic world.

We do not expect the United States to take this option. It is difficult to abandon a conflict that has gone on this long when it is not yet crystal clear that the Russians will actually be a threat later. (It is far easier for an analyst to make such suggestions than it is for a president to act on them.) Instead, the United States will attempt to bridge the Russian situation with gestures and half measures.

Nevertheless, American national strategy is in crisis. The United States has insufficient power to cope with two threats and must choose between the two. Continuing the current strategy means choosing to deal with the Islamic threat rather than the Russian one, and that is reasonable only if the Islamic threat represents a greater danger to American interests than the Russian threat does. It is difficult to see how the chaos of the Islamic world will cohere to form a global threat. But it is not difficult to imagine a Russia guided by the Medvedev Doctrine rapidly becoming a global threat and a direct danger to American interests.

We expect no immediate change in American strategic deployments — and we expect this to be regretted later. However, given U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s trip to the Caucasus region, now would be the time to see some movement in U.S. foreign policy. If Cheney isn’t going to be talking to the Russians, he needs to be talking to the Iranians. Otherwise, he will be writing checks in the region that the U.S. is in no position to cash.

By George Friedman

Link

Russia to create electromagnetic super weapon 

Technologies and discoveries 

Defense strategists place their stakes on high-tech weapons. Nearly all superpowers of the world conduct their works in the development of such weapons. It transpired recently that Russian scientists developed a generator, the capacity of which is comparable to that of a nuclear unit. It is a genuine scientific breakthrough, and it is already clear that the defense industry will not be the only field where the new super device is going to be used.

An individual, who is miles away from physics and is only familiar with home electricity, will not be able to imagine the power of several billions of watts. It will be even harder to imagine that such power can be generated by a device that is fit to be placed on a table.

“The devices generating such power – billions of watts – used to be very large in size before. This appliance has a very short impulse, which makes it possible to have it on a desk – it is a very compact device,” the Director of Lebedev’s Institute of Physics, Vice President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Gennady Mesyats said.

Mikhail Yalandin, one of the creators of the miraculous machine, said that the scientists had assembled two of such devices in Yekaterinburg – a bigger and a smaller one.

Never before had a relatively small device ever been able to generate electromagnetic impulses the capacity of which could be comparable to a huge water power plant. It is ten times as much as any foreign-made analogue.

The new device can be used practically anywhere. The invention will let specialists create radar telescopes and radars of new generation. Missile troops and defense departments on the whole will most likely be the first customers to order the appliance. The new generators can also be used to check the stability of large energy objects and systems. The device is capable of imitating the strays which appear as a result of a lightning strike or even a nuclear blast.

It is impossible to take photographs or film a video of the new generator in action because it immediately puts all electronic devices out of order.

The research that was used for the creation of such a device can be applied in the development of electromagnetic weapons.

“No one has ever studied biological effects of such impulses. It is obvious that it affects the electronic equipment near it. Computers or cell phones have to be screened from such radiation,” Mikhail Yalandin, a senior specialist of the Institute of Electrophysics said.

The device was called Nika, which means ‘victory’.

http://english.pravda.ru/science/tech/04-09-2008/106296-electromagnetic_super_weapon-0

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Russia to send ‘humanitarian aid’ to Cuba

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has ordered planeloads of humanitarian aid to be sent to Cuba – recently battered by Hurricane Gustav.

“Under orders from the Russian president, the emergency situations ministry is sending a cargo of humanitarian aid to Cuba,” said spokeswoman for the Russian ministry for natural disasters and emergency situations, Irina Andrianova Tuesday.

She added that four planes would carry ‘construction materials, food and essential supplies’ for Cubans.

RIA Novosti quoted Andrianova as saying that the first two planes were scheduled to take off for Cuba on Wednesday.

Hurricane Gustav blew through western Cuba with 150 mile per hour (240 kph) winds, damaging around 86,000 houses and leaving much of the region without electricity.

While no death has been recorded in Cuba, some 250,000 people were evacuated in four western provinces.

The report comes amid White House claims that Russia is mulling reigniting its close relationship with its former ally Cuba in a counter-measure against the US ‘defense missile shield’ which will be built in Eastern Europe.

Russia sends two more aid planes to hurricane-stricken Cuba

Russia sent two more aircraft carrying humanitarian aid to hurricane-stricken Cuba on Friday, a Russian emergencies service spokesperson said.

“The first Il-76 cargo aircraft took off at 10:40 a.m. Moscow time 06:40 GMT, and the second one at around 11:00 a.m. Moscow time 07:00 GMT. They will deliver around 60 metric tons of humanitarian cargo,” the spokesperson said.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev ordered the emergencies service to send four aircraft to Cuba to deliver tents for 5,000 people, construction materials, and food in the wake of Hurricane Gustav. The first two cargo aircraft arrived in Cuba on Thursday.

Hurricane Gustav swept through Cuba last Saturday with winds reaching 300 km p/h (186 mph) as it hit the Isla de la Juventud, to the south of the Cuban mainland.

The storm later swept through the province of Pinar del Rio on the country’s western tip, damaging around 86,000 houses and leaving much of the region without power.

No hurricane-related fatalities have been reported in Cuba, although Gustav took some 120 lives in other Caribbean islands, including Haiti, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic.

Tropical Storm Hanna has also killed at least 150 people in Haiti since Tuesday.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080905/116568768.html

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US invades Pakistan — but no complaints from the ‘international community’

I love it! I just came across an article, “Did We Just Invade Pakistan?” but you’ll search in vain for any headline in the mainstream media that even comes close to calling it a US invasion of Pakistan.

This is how the BBC reported it,

“Pakistan fury over ‘US assault’ Pakistan has summoned the US ambassador to protest at an alleged cross-border raid which officials say killed at least 15 villagers in the north-west.”

Talk about double-standards!

Note that the BBC puts the ‘US assault’ in single quotes and talks of an ‘alleged cross-border raid’ which calls into question whether or not the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’ did in fact assault, invade or otherwise use its helicopter gunships against yet another sovereign nation killing perhaps twenty people some of which are, by one report, children (‘US forces kill 20 in Pakistan cross-border raid’).

Predictably of course, the US denies that it ‘assaulted’ Pakistan. The BBC is not merely the mouthpiece for the UK state but also for the US. So much for ‘objective’ journalism. (For a cross-section of reactions see ‘Pakistan News-links 3-4 September 2008’.)

So what gives here? How come when Russia conducts a ‘cross-border raid’ to repel an invasion by Georgia of the Autonomous Region of Southern Ossetia, we read how it’s condemned by the ‘international community’? But then the ‘international community’ is at best ten countries, all of which are ‘allies’ of the US.

http://www.the-peoples-forum.com/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=4284