L’ombre de l’accord Sykes-Picot plane sur l’Asie du Sud-Ouest

La démission de l’amiral Fallon relance les hostilités en Irak
 

par Thierry Meyssan*

Contrairement à ce qui a été écrit dans la presse dominante, l’amiral William Fallon n’a pas été limogé par ce qu’il s’opposait au président Bush à propos d’une attaque contre l’Iran. Il a démissionné de sa propre initiative après que l’accord qu’il avait négocié et conclu avec Téhéran, Moscou et Pékin ait été saboté par la Maison-Blanche. Le choix de l’administration Bush relance la guerre en Irak et expose gravement les GI’s face à une Résistance désormais soutenue de l’extérieur sans retenue.

Il était presque 22h GMT, mardi 11 mars 2008, lorsque le commandant en chef du Central Command, l’amiral William Fallon, annonça depuis l’Irak qu’il présentait sa démission. Immédiatement à Washington, le secrétaire à la Défense, son ami Robert Gates, dans une conférence de presse improvisée indiquait qu’il acceptait cette décision à regret. Dans les minutes qui suivirent, la rumeur d’une possible attaque états-unienne contre l’Iran se répandit partout dans le monde. En effet, la démission de l’amiral aurait été exigée par la Maison-Blanche à la suite de la publication d’un reportage par le mensuel Esquire [1] rapportant des propos « francs » de l’officier à propos du président Bush. Or, dans le même article, on pouvait lire qu’un renvoi de l’amiral marquerait le signal ultime de la guerre.

Pourtant, cette interprétation est erronée. Elle ignore l’évolution du rapport de forces à Washington. Pour comprendre ce qui est en jeu, revenons un instant en arrière. Nos lecteurs, qui ont été régulièrement informés dans nos colonnes des débats en cours à Washington, se souviendront des menaces de démission de Fallon [2], de la mutinerie des officiers supérieurs [3], des dessous d’Annapolis [4], et de l’infiltration de l’OTAN au Liban [5] que nous avons rapportés dans ces colonnes avant tout le monde ; des révélations qui ont été contestées lors de leur publication et qui sont aujourd’hui largement attestées. Nous ajouterons ici des informations inédites sur les négociations conduites par Fallon.

Le Plan Fallon

Alors que l’establishment états-unien avait approuvé l’entrée en guerre contre l’Irak dans l’espoir d’en tirer de substantiels profits économiques, il a progressivement déchanté. Cette opération génère des coûts directs et indirects démesurés, mais ne rapporte qu’à quelques uns. Dès 2006, la classe dirigeante s’est inquiétée de mettre fin à cette aventure. Elle contestait à la fois le surdéploiement des troupes, l’isolement diplomatique grandissant, et l’hémoragie financière. Elle trouva son expression à travers le rapport Baker-Hamilton qui condamnait le projet de remodelage du Grand Moyen-Orient, et préconisait un retrait militaire d’Irak coordonné avec un rapprochement diplomatique avec Téhéran et Damas.

Sous cette amicale pression, le président Bush fut contraint de limoger Donald Rumsfeld et de le remplacer par Robert Gates (lui-même membre de Commission Baker-Hamilton). Un groupe de travail bipartisan —la Commission Armitage-Nye— fut mis en place pour définir de manière consensuelle une nouvelle politique. Mais il s’avéra que le tandem Bush-Cheney n’avait pas renoncé à ses projets et utilisait ce groupe de travail pour endormir ses rivaux tout en continuant à fourbir ses armes contre l’Iran. Coupant court à ces manœuvres, Gates donna carte blanche à un groupe d’officiers supérieurs qu’il avait fréquenté à l’époque de Bush père. Ceux-ci publièrent, le 3 décembre 2007, un rapport des agences de renseignement discréditant le discours mensonger de la Maison-Blanche sur le prétendue menace iranienne. En outre, ils tentèrent d’imposer au président Bush un rééquilibrage de sa politique proche-orientale au détriment d’Israël.

L’amiral William Fallon exerce une autorité morale sur ce groupe —incluant l’amiral Mike McConnell (directeur national du renseignement), le général Michael Hyden (directeur de la CIA), le général George Casey (chef d’état-major de l’armée de terre), et plus tard l’amiral Mike Mullen (chef-d’état-major inter-armes)—. Homme de sang froid, doué d’une brillante intelligence, il est l’un des derniers grands patrons des forces armées à avoir servi au Vietnam. Préoccupé par la multiplication des théâtres d’opération, par la dispersion des forces et l’épuisement des troupes, il a ouvertement contesté un leadership civil dont la politique ne peut conduire les États-Unis qu’à la défaite.

Dans le prolongement de cette mutinerie, ce groupe d’officiers supérieurs fut autorisé à négocier une sortie de crise honorable avec l’Iran et à préparer un retrait d’Irak. Selon nos sources, ils imaginèrent un accord en trois volets :
 1. Les États-Unis feraient adopter par le Conseil de sécurité une dernière résolution contre l’Iran pour ne pas perdre la face. Mais cette résolution serait vide et Téhéran s’en accommoderait.
 2. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad se rendrait en Irak où il affirmerait les intérêts régionaux de l’Iran. Mais ce voyage serait purement symbolique et Washington s’en accommoderait.
 3. Téhéran pèserait de toute son influence pour normaliser la situation en Irak, et faire passer les groupes qu’il soutient de la résistance armée à l’intégration politique. Cette stabilisation permettrait au Pentagone de retirer ses troupes sans défaite. En contrepartie, Washington cesserait son soutien aux groupes armés de l’opposition iranienne, notamment aux Moujahidines du peuple.

Toujours selon nos sources, Robert Gates et ce groupe d’officiers, encadrés par le général Brent Scowcroft (ancien conseiller national de sécurité), sollicitèrent l’aide de la Russie et de la Chine pour appuyer ce processus. D’abord perplexes, Moscou et Pékin s’assurèrent de l’assentiment forcé de la Maison-Blanche avant de répondre positivement, soulagés d’éviter un conflit incontrôlable.

Vladimir Poutine prit l’engagement de ne pas profiter militairement du retrait US, mais exigea qu’on en tire les conséquences politiques. Il fut donc convenu que la conférence d’Annapolis accoucherait d’une souris, tandis qu’une conférence globale sur le Proche-Orient serait organisée à Moscou pour débloquer les dossiers que l’administration Bush n’avait cessé d’envenimer.
De même Poutine accepta de faciliter le compromis irano-US, mais s’inquiéta d’un Iran trop fort à la frontière méridionale de la Russie. À titre de garantie, il fut convenu que l’Iran accepterait ce qu’il avait toujours refusé : de ne pas fabriquer seul son combustible nucléaire.

Les négociations avec Hu Jintao furent plus complexes, car les dirigeants chinois étaient choqués de découvrir à quel point l’administration Bush leur avait menti à propos de la prétendue menace iranienne. Il fallait donc d’abord rétablir la confiance bilatérale. Heureusement, l’amiral Fallon, qui il y a peu encore commandait le PacCom (zone Pacifique), entretenait des relations de courtoisie avec les Chinois.
Il fut convenu que Pékin laisserait passer une résolution anti-iranienne formelle au Conseil de sécurité, mais que la formulation de ce texte n’entraverait aucunement le commerce sino-iranien.

Le sabotage

Au premier abord, tout sembla fonctionner. Moscou et Pékin acceptèrent de jouer les figurants à Annapolis et de voter la résolution 1803 contre l’Iran. Tandis que le président Ahmadinejad savoura sa visite officielle à Bagadad où il rencontra en secret le chef d’état-major interarmes US, Mike Mullen, pour planifier la baisse de la tension en Irak. Mais le tandem Bush-Cheney ne s’avouait pas vaincu. Il sabota dès qu’il le put cette mécanique bien huilée.

Premièrement, la conférence de Moscou disparut dans les sables mouvants des mirages orientaux avant même d’avoir existé. Deuxièmement, Israël se lança à l’assaut de Gaza et l’OTAN déploya sa flotte au large du Liban de manière à relancer l’embrasement général du Grand Moyen-Orient, alors que Fallon s’efforçait d’éteindre les foyers d’incendie un à un. Troisièmement, la Maison-Blanche, habituellement si prompte à sacrifier ses employés, refusa de lâcher les Moujahidines du peuple.
Exaspérés les Russes massaient leur flotte au sud de Chypre pour surveiller les bâtiments de l’OTAN et envoyaient Sergeï Lavrov en tournée au Proche-Orient avec mission d’armer la Syrie, le Hamas et le Hezbollah pour rééquilibrer le Levant. Tandis que les Iraniens, furieux d’avoir été abusés, encourageaient la Résistance irakienne à casser du GI’s.

Voyant ses efforts réduits à néant, l’amiral Fallon démissionnait, seul moyen pour lui de conserver à terme son honneur et sa crédibilité face à ses interlocuteurs. L’interview d’Esquire, publié deux semaines plus tôt, n’est ici qu’un prétexte.

L’heure de vérité

Dans les trois prochaines semaines, le tandem Bush-Cheney va jouer son va-tout en Irak en faisant parler les armes. Le général David Petraeus, poussera à l’extrême son programme de contre-insurrection de manière à se présenter victorieux devant le Congrès, début avril. Simultanément, la Résistance irakienne, désormais soutenue à la fois par Téhéran, Moscou et Pékin, va multiplier les embuscades et chercher à tuer le maximum d’occupants.

Il appartiendra alors à l’establishment états-unien de tirer les conclusions du champ de bataille. Soit il jugera les résultats de Petraeus sur le terrain acceptables et le tandem Bush-Cheney terminera son mandat sans encombres. Soit, pour éviter le spectre de la défaite, il lui faudra sanctionner la Maison-Blanche et reprendre d’une manière ou d’une autre les négociations que l’amiral Fallon avait conduites.

Simultanément, Ehud Olmert interrompra les négociations initiées avec le Hamas via l’Égypte. Il chauffera la région jusqu’à la visite du président Bush en mai. Et les frères Janah et Hani Hammoud (respectivement coordinateur média de la Force multinationale en Irak et conseiller média de Saad Hariri), qui assurent la liaison des loyalistes libanais avec le général Petraeus et l’amiral Fitzgerald (OTAN), feront monter la tension au Liban.

Cette fièvre régionale devrait redynamiser le dispositif Bush, qu’il s’agisse des investissements dans le domaine militaro-industriel du fonds Carlyle, au bord de la faillite, ou de la campagne électorale de John McCain.

Vu de Washington, faut-il continuer à sacrifier la vie des GI’s pour une guerre qui a déjà coûté 3 trilliards de dollars et faire haïr les États-Unis même par leurs plus fidèles partenaires alors qu’elle n’a rapporté qu’à quelques sociétés détenues par le clan Bush et ses amis ?

http://www.voltairenet.org/article155917.html

Thierry Meyssan
Analyste politique, fondateur du Réseau Voltaire. Dernier ouvrage paru : L’Effroyable imposture 2 (le remodelage du Proche-Orient et la guerre israélienne contre le Liban).
 

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[1] « The Man Between War and Peace » par Thomas P.M. Barnett, Esquire, mars 2008.

[2] « La Maison-Blanche sacrifiera-t-elle la Ve flotte pour justifier la destruction nucléaire de l’Iran ? », par Michael Salla, Réseau Voltaire, 18 novembre 2007.

[3] « Washington décrète un an de trêve globale », par Thierry Meyssan, et « Pourquoi McConnell a-t-il publié le rapport sur l’Iran ? », Réseau Voltaire, 3 et 17 décembre 2007

[4] « La ‘solution à deux États’ sera bien celle de l’apartheid », par Thierry Meyssan, Réseau Voltaire, 13 janvier 2008.

[5] « La discrète arrivée de l’OTAN au Liban », par Thierry Meyssan, Réseau Voltaire, 10 mars 2008.

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US efforts to scuttle Iran-UAE ties fail

By Kimia Sanati

TEHRAN – Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)have begun top-level talks to boost economic relations, despite efforts by the United States to disrupt trade ties and an unresolved territorial dispute over the three strategic islands of Abu Mousa, the Lesser and the Greater Tunb in the Strait of Hormuz.

The UAE is already Iran’s top trade partner with bilateral trade reaching US$14 billion, according to official sources.

The US, concerned about Iran’s plans to develop nuclear know-how, “has tried to hurt the Iranian economy through unilateral sanctions,” an observer in Tehran told Inter Press Service (IPS).

“They consider UN sanctions too mild to achieve enough pressure on Iran to halt its nuclear program. To bring the Iranian economy to its knees the US has been encouraging and even putting pressure on all Iran’s trade partners, including the UAE, to stop dealing with Iran. This can and has hurt much more than the UN sanctions.”

At the forefront of efforts by the US to curb local trade with Iran are foreign banks with branches in the UAE. These continue to deal with firms that have Iranian partners, “but they are more cautious – they scrutinize them more when extending facilities”, Nasser Hashempour, executive deputy president of the Dubai-based Iranian Business Council, said this month, according to a report on the MiddleEast Online website.

UAE-based branches of international banks have “asked most Iranian individuals who have personal accounts with them to close their accounts”, Hashempour said.

Many international banks, including British-Asian bank HSBC, Deutsche Bank and Swiss giants UBS and Credit Suisse, have stopped dealing with Iran in line with sanctions imposed by the US to pressure Tehran into halting its program of uranium enrichment, the report said.

Yet “stopping trade with Iran is in no way in the best interests of the UAE, which has the greater share of the lucrative trade relations, and hence their big dilemma is whether to relent to the US pressure and keep Americans happy or serve their own national interests and economy”, the observer said.

Bilateral trade between the UAE and the US fell 25% to $2.67 billion during the first quarter of last year compared with the same period of the previous year, according to the BusinessIntelligence Middle East website, citing US Department of Commerce data. UAE imports from the US fell 26% to $2.36 billion in the period compared with a year earlier, while UAE exports to the US fell by 7% to $307.6 million, cutting by 29% the UAE balance of trade deficit with the US, the website reported.

Trade between the US and the UAE declined 16% to $5.43 billion during the first half of 2007, ArabianBusiness.com reported, citing the US Bureau of Statistics.

Last May, Iran’s President Mahmud Ahmadinejad became the first Iranian president since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 to visit the UAE. This was reciprocated last week by Sheikh Mohammad bin Rashid, prime minister of the UAE and ruler of Dubai, in a rare, top-level visit. He reiterated his country’s stance, expressed earlier at a joint press conference with Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, that Iran had a right to peaceful nuclear technology.

Importantly, the sheikh also said Iran was no threat to regional states. “Allegations by aliens the US that Iran is a threat to the region are vague, as regional states share a lot of historic and contemporary common grounds,” the UAE premier was quoted by reporters as saying.

“The UAE prime minister’s visit is proof that US policies will not have any impact in the region,” Ahmadinejad said during his meeting with Sheikh Mohammad.

Ahmadinejad has offered to provide regional Arab countries that have their own nuclear ambitions with Iranian nuclear know-how. Referring to Iran’s nuclear technology, he told the visiting UAE prime minister that Iran was fully prepared to “put its valuable achievements” at the UAE’s disposal.

The visit, a little more than a month after one to the UAE by US President George Bush, sparked speculation about a nuclear message being relayed by the UAE prime minister to Tehran.

Iran’s ambassador in the UAE, Hamid-Reza Assefi, rejected the speculation. Sheikh Mohammad “just informed us of his country’s stance regarding Iran’s nuclear issue and said Iran had a right to have access to peaceful nuclear technology”, the Iranian ambassador was quoted as saying by semi-official Fars News Agency.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which the UAE is a member, acknowledges all nations’ right to peaceful nuclear energy but has concerns about a nuclear Iran. Other members are Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain.

A report, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), by the US intelligence bodies in December 2007 seems to have put the minds of Iran’s Arab neighbors at greater ease as to the nature of its nuclear program. The report said that Iran’s nuclear program had not been of a military nature since 2003.

The NIE report has done little to alter Bush’s policy towards Iran. In January during an official visit to the UAE, he accused Iran once again of sponsoring terrorism. The US president said Iran’s actions threatened the security of nations everywhere and promised that the US was rallying friends to confront the Iranian danger before it was too late.

Bush’s customary rhetoric against Iran was not well received in the UAE and in other countries in the region. “Unfortunately, the focus of this epoch-making visit to Abu Dhabi and Dubai has been on the US preoccupation with Iran, rather than America’s strong and healthy relations with the UAE and other Gulf allies,” UAE’s pro-government Khaleej Times wrote.

“Just as the Gulf countries have healthy relations with the West, including the US, they also have historical, cultural and economic ties with Iran,” the newspaper wrote. “The UAE happens to be Iran’s biggest trading partner. This is why the UAE and other Gulf countries wouldn’t want any more confrontation and conflict between the US and Iran. The Middle East and Gulf region, already suffering from two conflicts, cannot afford any more tensions. Peace and only peace is the way forward.”

The US has been trying to paint Iran as a scarecrow to the Arab nations, particularly to the Persian Gulf states, an observer in Tehran told IPS. “But Arab nations seem to be increasingly disillusioned with US policies. The GCC countries say they will not allow any attacks on Iran from their soil. They seem to be more worried by a nuclear Israel that is continuing its aggressive policies without any hindrance,” the observer said.

“Before the UN began to impose sanctions on Iran to stop its nuclear program and the US stepped up its unilateral sanctions, the thriving economy of the UAE, and Dubai in particular, was seen as a serious threat to Iranian economy here,” he said.

“Capital flowed, and still flows, from Iran to Dubai in huge sums in search of safety and profits. Iranian investors are now holding somewhere around $300 billion in capital in the UAE. The trade volume between the two countries was up by 25% last year. The Emirates are profiting in terms of money while Iran benefits by the trade between the two countries that enables its economy to meet the domestic demand for imports,” he added.

The greater part of Iranian imports from the UAE consists of re-exports from the country. This enables Iran to lay its hands on things the unilateral US sanctions have made difficult or impossible to acquire from other sources. The fact is reflected in the figures for the trade volume in the Iranian fiscal year that ended in March 2007, during which the UAE’s share of the $11.7 billion non-oil exports between the two countries was $9.2 billion.

The US lobbying has made things harder for Iranians and their trade partners in the rest of the world but they have found ways of circumvention. Many Iranian companies have registered in the UAE to continue their business and unofficial money transfer channels have taken the place of banks.

“For quite a few years my firm has been importing machinery parts, re-exports from Europe and elsewhere in fact, from Dubai,” the chief executive of an importing company told IPS in Tehran. “Things went rather smoothly in the past, but recently one main Canadian supplier said they couldn’t deal with us directly or they’d be boycotted by the Americans. They suggested that we register a company in Dubai. We had to find a local partner to hold 51% of the shares according to local regulations.”

At the same time, “international banks where we had our accounts asked us to close them and said they would no longer accept letters of credit from Iran’s Saderat and Melli banks, which have several branches in the UAE. This has made us deal in cash and use unofficial money transfer systems, which raises the end price of the imported goods for us,” he said.

Besides economic factors, the issue of the disputed islands was brought up during the UAE premier’s visit. Iran is prepared for talks with the UAE to “remove misunderstanding over the Persian Gulf Island of Abu Mousa”, Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini was quoted by Islamic Republic News Agency as saying following the UAE premier’s visit.

The territorial dispute between the two countries over the three islands dates to 1971 when the seven states comprising the UAE gained independence from Britain.

While insisting on its non-negotiable sovereignty over the disputed islands, Iran says it favors talks to resolve the issue. The UAE has in the past sought to settle the issue of the islands that it calls “occupied” through the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

In May 2005, the UAE officially appealed to the UN to arbitrate on the issue of the disputed islands. The UAE’s claim has repeatedly been backed by the GCC members and other Arab states.

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Obama’s “Coalition of the Willing” Against Iran?

Continuity rather than Change in US Foreign Policy

by Ali Fathollah-Nejad

Global Research, November 20, 2008
- 2008-11-19

A Mere Atmospheric Change in Obama’s Foreign Policy: U.S. London-Based Pundits See Rather Continuity Than Change

LONDON – After Barack Obama’s victory in the U.S. presidential elections last week, discussions about what direction an Obama/Biden Administration is likely to follow are gaining momentum.

Invited by the London Middle East Institute (LMEI) on 11 November to speak about the foreign policy of the next U.S. administration, the London-based American analyst Jonathan Paris anticipated an Obama foreign policy much in line with the one of the current Bush administration.

The main areas of concern, he asserted, would be Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. Focusing extensively on the latter, Paris said that sanctions will be kept up with even the aim of aggravating those. Meanwhile, one should not “beg” Russia to join the efforts by the P5+1 – i.e. the five permanent UN Security Council members and Germany – to increase pressure on Iran. Rather would it suffice to wait for Russia to join an anti-Iran “coalition of the willing.” Moscow has so far been reluctant to Washington’s insistence to impose further sanctions on Tehran. According to Paris, who like Norman Podhoretz is an adjunct fellow at the neoconservative U.S. think-tank Hudson Institute, Washington’s overall goal would be to “win over” Russia so to avoid any opposition to its preferred policies.

Drawing on Obama’s campaign announcement to enter into direct negotiations with Iran, Paris stressed that this would test the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s willingness to come along. Although proponents of a thus-designed “overture” vis-à-vis Tehran expect the Iranian leadership to repudiate, other experts point out that such an outcome is far from obvious with the Iranians being seriously interested in normalizing ties with the United States. Paris reiterated that Israel could only attack Iran with U.S. support.

Paris, a Middle East fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations in New York from 1995 to 2000, stated that other spotlights would be Pakistan – which he described as constituting the “prize” –, “the most pivotal state in the Middle East,” Egypt, with President Hosni Mubarak’s succession pending, and Iraq where “corruption” of the Baghdad government would be the core problem without mentioning Obama’s promise to withdraw occupation forces there. While tackling the so-called “rogue states,” of course China would be a central focal point for Washington’s foreign policies, Paris added.

Multilateralism “Yes,” Multipolarity “Not So Fast”!

Paris, who is also a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, classified a future president Obama opting for “cooptation” rather than confrontation, a characteristic attributed to the Bush Administration. While he approved multilateralism, he cautioned against multipolarity whose dawn he commented with occurring “not so fast.”

He described the decision-making process of the forthcoming administration to be “bottom-up,” implying that Obama will be very much acting upon advise given to him. Paris conceded that only “atmospheric change” would come during an Obama presidency.

A few days earlier on 5 November, Mark Fitzpatrick, at a panel on “nuclear futures after the U.S. elections” at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, stated that establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction free zone in the Middle East could not be found among the top-ten list of an Obama administration. Fitzpatrick, an American senior fellow for non-proliferation at the IISS, said that the main obstacle to launching a regional conference to such an end would be the lack of “mutual recognition” between Israel and Iran. However, he did not mention Iran’s “grand bargain” offer of spring 2003 to the U.S. which inter alia included a de facto recognition of the state of Israel. Washington at that time ignored this remarkable Iranian overture that included Tehran’s willingness to settle all controversial issues in U.S.–Iran relations.1

Fitzpatrick presaged that a future president Obama would command U.S. marines in the Persian Gulf to start communicating with the Iranian navy in order to avoid any confrontation provoked by misperceptions. In terms of nuclear disarmament, he proposed that in the first 100 days of the new administration, the U.S. could de-alert the status of its nuclear arsenal, but preferably doing so only when Russia acts likewise.

In sum, both London-based U.S. analysts did not signal any change of an Obama administration’s foreign policy stance especially when compared to the Bush administration’s second term. Their remarks implied that the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 and 2005 which formed the basis of President George W. Bush’ s foreign policy agenda and which included the Bush/Wolfowitz preventive strike doctrine would not be revised. According to veteran U.S. Middle East expert William R. Polk the removal of the George W. Bush’s NSS, which “threatens Iran with destruction,” would be an absolute prerequisite for any serious change in Washington’s world policy.2 The American pundits rather upheld the belief that there will be continuity in Washington’s strategic outlines and actual policies with Obama and that the only change that could be expected will occur in terms of rhetoric.

Notes

1 See Gareth Porter (2006) “Burnt Offering. How a 2003 secret overture from Tehran might have led to a deal on Iran’s nuclear capacity—if the Bush administration hadn’t rebuffed it,” The American Prospect, Vol. 17, No. 6 (June), pp. 20—25.

2 See Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2008) “Iran Falling into the “Net” of a “Worldwide Policy”: On the U.S. Foreign Policy Doctrine and Its Present Dangers – Exclusive Interview with William R. Polk,” Global Research, 16 October.

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (M.Sc. cum laude, M.A., B.Sc., B.A.) was educated in bi-national study programs in France (Sciences-Po Lille), Germany (U Münster) and the Netherlands (U Twente) covering the fields of political science, sociology, law, history, and economics. His current main areas of research are U.S. and EU policies vis-à-vis Iran and the new geography of power in the 21st century.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11058

Iranian Commander: Bush’s Iran War Plan Delivered to Obama

The Bush administration has created the required infrastructure for attacking Iran and delivered his war plan to Obama, a senior Iranian military official said Saturday, adding that Obama’s election has provided Iran with a one-year opportunity to increase preparedness.

Addressing a meeting to mark the start of the Week of Basij (mobilization of volunteer forces), lieutenant commander of the General Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces Major General Gholam-Ali Rasheed said that US President George Bush has established the infrastructures required in the region for posing a threat to Iran.

“The United States’ threats have now found a structural form. They have done the planning for reaching the necessary preparedness to wage a war (against Iran) through setting up military bases, holding (security) pacts, etc.,” he said.

The General viewed “northwestern and southeastern Iran as well as the southwestern province of Khuzestan as vulnerable points” the US forces are likely to use if they want to invade Iran, and underlined that the aforementioned areas should become invulnerable within the next one year.

He further urged military officials to leave war rhetoric and expression of foreign policy views to politicians and “accelerate measures to boost Iran’s deterrent power”.

Considering that the country is now under threat, he said, we should consider measures to prevent entering the stage of actual war.

US forces attacked a Syrian village near the borders with Iraq on October 26, and the raid on Sukkariyah, which took place almost simultaneously with an air raid on a Pakistani village, has raised speculation about the likelihood of similar unilateral strikes by the US troops on other regional states, including the Islamic Republic.

Speculation that Israel could also bomb Iran mounted after a big Israeli air drill in June. In the first week of June, 100 Israeli F-16 and F-15 fighters reportedly took part in an exercise over the eastern Mediterranean and Greece, which was interpreted as a dress rehearsal for a possible attack on Iran’s nuclear installations.

Israel and its close ally the United States accuse Iran of seeking a nuclear weapon, while they have never presented any corroborative document to substantiate their allegations. Both Washington and Tel Aviv possess advanced weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear warheads.

Iran vehemently denies the charges, insisting that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. Tehran stresses that the country has always pursued a civilian path to provide power to the growing number of Iranian population, whose fossil fuel would eventually run dry.

Iran has, in return, warned that it would target Israel and its worldwide interests in case it comes under attack by the Tel Aviv.

The United States has also always stressed that military action is a main option for the White House to deter Iran’s progress in the field of nuclear technology.

Iran has warned that in case of an attack by either the US or Israel, it will target 32 American bases in the Middle East and close the strategic Strait of Hormoz.

An estimated 40 percent of the world’s oil supply passes through the waterway.

In a Sep. 11 report, the Washington Institute for the Near East Policy says that in the two decades since the Iran-Iraq War, the Islamic Republic has excelled in naval capabilities and is able to wage unique asymmetric warfare against larger naval forces.
According to the report, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy (IRGCN) has been transformed into a highly motivated, well-equipped, and well-financed force and is effectively in control of the world’s oil lifeline, the Strait of Hormuz.

The study says that if Washington takes military action against the Islamic Republic, the scale of Iran’s response would likely be proportional to the scale of the damage inflicted on Iranian assets.

Meantime, a recent study by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), a prestigious American think tank, has found that a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities “is unlikely” to delay the country’s program.

Intensified threats by Tel Aviv and Washington of military action against Iran contradict a recent report by 16 US intelligence bodies which endorsed the civilian nature of Iran’s nuclear plans and activities.

Following the US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and similar reports by the IAEA head – one in November and the other one in February – which praised Iran’s truthfulness about key aspects of its past nuclear activities and announced settlement of outstanding issues with Tehran, any effort to impose further sanctions or launch military attack on Iran seems to be completely irrational.

The February report by the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, praised Iran’s cooperation in clearing up all of the past questions over its nuclear program, vindicating Iran’s nuclear program and leaving no justification for any new UN sanctions.

The UN nuclear watchdog has also carried out at least 14 surprise inspections of Iran’s nuclear sites so far, but found nothing to support West’s allegations.

Also in another report to the 35-nation Board of Governors, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei confirmed “the non-diversion” of nuclear material in Iran and added that the agency had found no “components of a nuclear weapon” or “related nuclear physics studies” in the country.

The IAEA report confirmed that Iran has managed to enrich uranium-235 to a level “less than 5 percent”. Such a rate is consistent with the construction of a nuclear power plant. Nuclear arms production, meanwhile, requires an enrichment level of above 90 percent.

The Vienna-based UN nuclear watchdog continues snap inspections of Iranian nuclear sites and has reported that all “declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities.”

Mohammed ElBaradei, chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency, recently said that Iran remains far from acquiring capabilities to develop nuclear weapons as it is still lacking the key components to produce an atomic weapon.

“They do not have even the nuclear material, the raw unenriched uranium to develop one nuclear weapon if they decide to do so,” said the head of the UN nuclear watchdog agency.

Following the said reports by the US and international bodies, many world states have called the UN Security Council pressure against Tehran unjustified, demanding that Iran’s case be normalized and returned from the UNSC to the IAEA.

http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8709020565

Can NATO take a tough line when Putin shows up at its summit?

By John Vinocur

February 25, 2008

PARIS: Why is NATO inviting Vladimir Putin as a guest-intruder to its summit meeting in Bucharest this April?

It’s not as if Putin, up close and personal, could make himself any clearer on Russia’s opposition to a U.S. missile shield in Europe, independence for Kosovo, and expanding NATO’s membership, all the while insisting on what, so far, is his view of the peaceful intentions of Iran’s nuclear drive.

Take this most recent two-week slice out of the reign of Vladimir I while he switches sovereign titles (can you bear the suspense of that presidential election without him Sunday?) from chief of state to prime minister:

On Feb. 12, the same day he accepted NATO’s invitation, Putin warned Ukraine that it could become a target of Russia’s nuclear missiles if it joined the alliance. Last Friday, his official onlooker at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Dmitri Rogozin, struck the same compliant note.

If NATO “breaches its mandate” in Kosovo, Rogozin said, or if the European Union reaches a unified position on the issue – subtext: don’t you dare – then, “We too would have to proceed from the view that in order to be respected we must use brute force, in other words, armed force.”

Raúl Castro becomes Cuban presidentA painful past sparks concern about Obama’s safetyIn Argentina, no assistance from region on gas needsAccording to David Kramer, who’s in charge of the State Department’s Russian affairs section, Russia does not want a military confrontation on Kosovo and won’t send troops to bolster its ally in Serbia. But Moscow, he says, does want to demonstrate its power to the world and stoked the mood leading to the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade.

So why the invitation to Putin? Because it’s a yearly practice that’s been going on since the creation in 2002 of a NATO-Russia Council. Over the years, Putin never said yes.

Now, for the first time, Putin has accepted the invitation, and NATO is stuck with a convention that no longer fits Russia’s increasingly aggressive tone and its threats to the alliance’s members, or those who would join it.

Putin is coupling his trip to Bucharest on April 2-4 with a proposal to George W. Bush that he fly on afterwards to Sochi on the Black Sea for one-on-one conversations. The White House has not publicly acknowledged the invitation nor made known its response.

Sure, it’s wise and reasonable to keep talking to your antagonists even if they’ve resumed sending bomber patrols, Cold War-style, to Iceland or over a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Sea of Japan.

But on recent experience, Putin does not come to the West’s parlor to be publicly conciliatory.

His speech a year ago in Munich described the United States as the world’s biggest problem – an attack surprising for its brutality, and shocking for how little tough response there was to it from his host, Angela Merkel, or, for that matter, the White House.

If Putin sounded strong then and the West weak, there was a reason for it: No common will existed among NATO members to say that Russia had devolved into a serious problem, its democratic inklings strangled, and its bullying of neighbors or energy clients hardened into an inescapable pattern.

That silence risks continuing.

In Bucharest, Putin could choose softer language, but in the view of one NATO analyst, he will go on seeking to split the organization on whether it should accept Ukraine and Georgia as applicants for membership.

Putin seems to think that the alliance, overwhelmed by its Russia/Kosovo and Afghanistan concerns, can be pushed into taking a pass.

NATO’s counter to this is small-scale and tactical. The agenda for the summit meeting has been arranged so that the alliance’s meeting with Putin comes last. Discussions of enlargement and Afghanistan will be complete by the time he speaks.

That’s not much of an answer to Putin’s trying to delimit NATO’s prerogatives. In shutting up, it would look like an organization holding tight to a framework for relations that has progressively lost most of its meaning since 2002.

What NATO, with one voice, well might do instead is to call Putin out on a couple of big issues beyond Kosovo or the missile shield.

1. Energy supply. It’s pretty much forgotten now, but the 2006 Group of 8 summit meeting in St. Petersburg – the one Senator John McCain wanted to boycott because it would not regulate fair relations between purchasers and suppliers – actually ended with a declaration that has some clear, useful language on the subject.

The issue has become an obvious strategic concern for NATO. In Bucharest, the alliance could broaden and strengthen the 2006 language, and put it to Putin to accept – a marker that would challenge his strong-arm policy on oil and gas supply.

2. Iran. Simulations of centrifuges currently used by Iran to enrich uranium, performed by the European Union’s Joint Research Center, have produced a scenario (presuming 100 percent efficiency of the devices) which gives Iran the material necessary for a bomb by the end of the year. As reported by Spiegel Online, a second simulation, based on just 25 percent efficiency, would put the date at the end of 2010.

Many of the leaders at the NATO summit meeting have heard directly from Putin that he does not want an Iran with nuclear weapons. But in answer to private questions from some of them about what he will do to stop Iran’s nuclear drive, he has never given either a precise or reassuring reply.

Putin’s fudge continues to turn on his assertion that nothing indicates the mullahs’ nuclear activities are anything but peaceful.

A NATO that has backed an American antimissile shield for Poland and the Czech Republic to guard Europe against an attack from Tehran can surely muster the courage in Bucharest to publicly ask Putin what he will do to stop an Iranian bomb.

Or so you would think.

As much as talks between the West and Russia on an expert level remain a necessity, it’s a perverse reality in 2008 that NATO is giving Putin a bully pulpit for what’s certain to be his first strategic valedictory to the world.

Is anyone out there on the NATO side preparing to take the floor and set the record straight?

http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/25/america/politicus.php?page=2

Water and Turkish Security

By Ilan Berman
published in the Turkish Policy Quarterly,
Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 2002), pp. 43-49

In 1991, while still Egyptian Foreign Minister, former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali cautioned that the next war in the Middle East could be over water. Boutros-Ghali’s warning may have been prophetic, for water is reshaping the political landscape of the contemporary Middle East.

This is no overstatement. According to a survey conducted by the World Bank in 1996, water availability in the Middle East was deemed to be the worst in the world, a mere fraction of Asian and African levels. These conditions have only worsened, as lingering drought conditions, population growth and resource mis-management have eroded regional resources.

The impact on Middle Eastern nations is ruinous. Syria’s deepening water woes, for example, already substantially affect that country’s main source of revenue, its agricultural sector, and have forced Damascus to enact restrictive water rationing measures. In spite of this, Syria’s water situation is expected to worsen, since at its current rate of growth the Syrian population is expected to double the country’s demand for water in less than two decades. Jordan faces a similar situation. Fed only by underground sources and the Jordan River, Amman is experiencing an escalating water deficit – one expected to reach 250 million cubic meters, nearly 1/3rd of current annual consumption, by the end of the decade. Even Israel, which has long viewed water as a cardinal element of its national security, faces hydrological crisis. Expanding demand, domestic mismanagement and mounting international commitments have stretched the country’s National Water System to its limit, leading officials to warn of an imminent catastrophe.

Not surprisingly, however, the region’s turbulent power politics have impeded any sort of consensus over these dwindling resources. The vast majority of regional agreements, constructed as bilateral diplomatic ententes, fail to address the rights of neighboring countries or the growing needs brought about by social and environmental changes. Those that do, only do so abstractly or implicitly. As a result, hydro-politics now looms large in the strategic calculations of countries in the region, and has emerged as a distinct element of Mideast national security and foreign policy planning.

For Turkey, water represents one of the most important, though least explored, items on the country’s contemporary security agenda. Geographically situated on the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and enjoying substantial annual rainfall, Turkey is far and away the region’s dominant hydrological power. This position has inextricably linked water to several important elements of Ankara’s Mideast policy – its troubled relationship with Damascus, the problem of Kurdish terrorism, and the evolving strategic relationship with Israel.

The Iraq-Syria equation

Water has been the primary source of tension between Ankara and Damascus since the late 1970s, when commencement of the ambitious Southeast Anatolia development project (the Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi, or GAP) shifted the balance of the power equation among Turkey and her neighbors. Through its extensive manipulation of the Euphrates, GAP has provided Turkey with broad control over regional resources, making it capable of influencing Syrian, as well as Iraqi, water supplies. Despite repeated efforts to allay Syrian concerns (most notably a 1987 Protocol in which Ankara committed to ensuring an average flow of 500cm/sec from the Euphrates), progress on GAP has increasingly underscored Syria’s susceptibility to Turkish water control. The clearest example of this occurred in January of 1990, when Turkey’s temporary diversion of the Euphrates for agricultural purposes left Syria almost wholly without water.

This vulnerability prompted a number of notable developments in Syrian foreign policy. Militarily, Damascus assumed the role of chief broker for the radical Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), using it as a proxy through which to disrupt and destabilize Turkey’s Anatolia region. The overt linkage between the group’s guerrilla activities and the water issue was underscored in the 1987 Protocol, under which Damascus pledged to curb its support for the PKK in return for Turkish water guarantees. But despite this commitment – and the PKK’s subsequent relocation to Lebanon’s Bek’aa valley – Syria remained an active sponsor of the terrorist group throughout the 1990s, using its activities as a tool to impede Turkey’s hydrological development. Syria’s sponsorship of the organization finally fomented a major crisis in October 1998, when the Turkish parliament issued an ultimatum to Damascus, calling for it to curb its support for terrorism or “face the consequences.” Under this intense pressure, the Assad regime capitulated, signing the so-called Adana memorandum and forswearing support for the PKK.

Continued perceptions of vulnerability also prompted Damascus to initiate a series of diplomatic measures aimed at diminishing Turkish hydrological power. In 1996, Syria made an unsuccessful diplomatic bid to acquire Turkish water as a precondition for negotiations with Israel. Damascus repeated this move in the year 2000 round of Israeli-Syrian negotiations; in a bold but failed overture, the Assad regime proposed to compensate Israel with Turkish water for any loss of resources from the Golan Heights – a move that would have simultaneously lessened Turkish power and bound Ankara to Israeli-Syrian agreements.

Finally, water has served as a central factor behind Syria’s deepening strategic coordination with its historic rival, Iraq. In a dramatic break from their longstanding regional competition, in 1990 the two Ba’athist regimes signed the Agreement on the Sharing of the Euphrates, which was primarily intended to counter their common vulnerability to Turkish water control. Since then, despite a temporary rift during the early 1990s (the result of Syria’s participation in the U.S.-led Gulf War coalition), Damascus and Baghdad have grown consistently closer in joint opposition to Turkish water power. In February 2000, common concern over Ankara led the two countries to reestablish formal diplomatic ties for the first time in over a decade. And since the ascension of Bashar Assad to the Syrian presidency in July of 2000, movements toward reconciliation have accelerated, evidenced by a spate of high-level diplomatic contacts and Iraqi visits to Damascus.

For Damascus, this tilt is the logical end result of a series of unsuccessful measures designed to dislodge Turkish control over the Euphrates. Baghdad, for its part, has embraced the idea of a strategic alignment directed against Turkey’s superior hydrological position in the region. With water from the Tigris and Euphrates representing some 95-98 percent of Iraqi industrial/agricultural needs (and close to 85 percent of domestic consumption), the Iraqi government is both acutely aware of Ankara’s hold on its domestic water situation and eager to eliminate Turkey’s leverage.

Both countries are now in the process of making this goal a reality. Since late 2001, Syria and Iraq have commenced joint diplomatic efforts to reopen long-dormant discussions with Turkey regarding the water equation between the three countries. And they appear to be succeeding. Over the past year, in response to mounting diplomatic pressure, the Turkish government has qualified its longstanding policy of sovereign hydrological control and indicated a willingness to reopen long-dormant discussions with Syria and Iraq over the water equation among the three countries.

The Turkish-Israeli entente

Water has also emerged as central element in the evolving strategic dialogue between Ankara and Jerusalem. For Israel, control over water has long been a cardinal security concern, contributing to the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War and playing a major role in the country’s decision to establish a security zone in Southern Lebanon in the early 1980s. Its importance to the country’s national security doctrine was clearly articulated by the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture’s 1990 declaration that “it is difficult to conceive of any political solution consistent with Israel’s survival that does not involve complete continued Israeli control of… water and sewage systems.”

Not surprisingly, therefore, hydrological cooperation quickly emerged as an important element of the Jewish State’s dialogue with Turkey following the initiation of political contacts in the mid-1990s. In July of 1999, as part of the growing political warmth between Ankara and Jerusalem, then-Turkish President Süleyman Demirel made a landmark offer to supply Israel with water from the Manavgat River. The subsequent memorandum signed between the two countries codified Turkey’s commitment to provide Israel with 50 million cubic meters of water – equivalent to 2.5% of Israel’s annual water requirements – per year.

Nevertheless, a final accord on water cooperation remained elusive. Israeli fears of dependence on extraneous water sources, and Jerusalem’s serious misreading of the significance attached by Ankara to the water issue, served to stall hydrological negotiations between the two countries, with dramatic results. Over a six-month time period in 2000, Israel lost upwards of $5 billion in defense contracts with Turkey – including tenders for advanced attack helicopters and a lucrative $1 billion tank modernization and upgrade program – in a clear manifestation of Turkish displeasure over the stalled hydrological talks between the two countries. As late as the fall of 2001, Israeli delays were prompting Turkish officials to threaten the suspension of additional weapons projects between the two countries.

Since then, Ankara and Jerusalem appear to have reached a tentative accord on the water issue. In October 2002, the two countries formally concluded a 20-year agreement under which Israel committed to purchasing from Turkey 50 million cubic meters of water annually. Nevertheless, implementation of the agreement is still pending, as the two countries remain divided on both the price of the water and its means of delivery.

The Challenge for Turkish Policy

For Turkey, the water issue is thus one of both crisis and opportunity. The tactical alliance becoming visible between Damascus and Baghdad is, quite clearly, a challenge to Turkey’s hydrological position in the region, as is Syria’s continued involvement with the PKK, now known as KADEK. The level of real commitment in Damascus to the 1998 Adana memorandum is a matter of open debate in Turkish national security circles, and officials in Ankara cannot, therefore, rule out the possibility that some future array of circumstances (such as additional GAP development or a further deterioration of Syria’s internal hydrological situation) might again make the extremist group an instrument that Syria would attempt to use to blunt Turkish water power.

Turkey’s future relations with Israel are also likely to be profoundly defined by the water issue. As Turkish officials make clear, hydrological cooperation is seen in Ankara as a test of Israel’s reciprocity in the larger strategic relationship between the two countries. As such, Turkey will continue to look upon the water issue as a barometer of Jerusalem’s commitment to strategic ties. Recent movements toward a durable hydrological relationship are undoubtedly a positive development. However, should this relationship flounder or be handled improperly by the Israeli government, the resulting discord could have a chilling effect on the overall tenor of the Turkish-Israeli strategic dialogue. Conversely, lasting accord on the water issue, and Jerusalem’s recognition of the strategic value placed by Ankara on hydrological cooperation, is likely to spur a revitalization of ties.

In fact, such an agreement could open new vistas for strategic cooperation between Israel and Turkey. Since extensive regional water planning requires commerce and technology stretching across borders, it also requires a political-military structure capable of ensuring its safety and security – a traditional alliance able to deter hostile regimes. Clearly, the Turkish-Israeli strategic entente fits this bill, and an expansion of the strategic dialogue between the two countries could create a defensive shield for regional resources.

This type of alignment, in turn, could lay the groundwork for further regional water development. Lebanon, for example, has the capacity to become a significant regional water producer. With some nine billion cubic meters of rainfall annually, large surface water supplies and additional resources from the Hasbani, Litani and Orontes rivers, Lebanon could potentially be harnessed to meet regional needs. What’s more, Lebanese officials have intimated that they are both willing and able to have their country serve as a regional water source. A pro-Western pivot, one capable of loosening Damascus’ grip over Beirut, could eventually allow Lebanon to regain its independence and develop into such a role.

Above all, in a region where water is rapidly becoming a strategic imperative, an alliance capable of guarding against hostile diplomacy or “water grabs” remains a prerequisite for meaningful cooperation. Such a grouping could serve as a framework for regional water security – one that, over time, might be expanded to include Jordan and other emerging pro-Western states as well.

Furthermore, with the proper political will, and the backing of the United States, such a grouping could bring real hydrological and political change to the region.

http://www.afpc.org/berman-TPQ.shtml

The Arab President US Media Doesn’t Want You to See

By Ali Baghdadi

(arabjournl@aol.com, arabjournl@hotmail.com, Chicago )

Most Americans are familiar with President Mubarak of Egypt , King Abdallah II of Jordan, King Abdallah of Saudi Arabia , President Assad of Syria , and a few other Arab leaders.  They are frequently seen in print media and on TV.  They have one thing in common.  Their skin is white.  As a matter of fact, the Syrian leader is blond with blue eyes.

Though the Sudan is the largest country on the African continent (2.5 million square kilometers), and its population exceeds forty million, have you ever seen its President Omar Hassan al-Bashir on TV?  Though the news of the Sudan and its western region, Darfur, appear almost daily in the U.S. media, have you at any time seen his picture in a newspaper or a magazine?

I doubt you did!  It is not your fault.  The U.S. media hides him from your sight.

The question is: Why do our media keep him away from public view?

Mr. al-Bashir is known to be gentle, kind, and pleasant.  His smile is genuine.  One can easily connect with al-Bashir for his humility, warmth, and frankness.  He doesn’t play dirty games.  He doesn’t speak in double tongues.  He is a man of high principles.

Near the end of last February, Mr. al-Bashir spoke live to thousands of African-Americans via satellite at the Nation of Islam’s Savior’s Day convention in Detroit for almost an hour and a half.  Without any form of censorship, he was prepared to respond to questions from the American media regarding any subject of concern, particularly Darfur .

Although the event had been highly publicized and the media had been informed long in advance, only a couple of major media outfits showed any interest.  Their questions were outright stupid.  They didn’t take advantage of this golden opportunity to relay to their viewers the other side of the story coming directly from its source.  The only thing that concerned them was whether or not the Sudanese President was going to allow the so-called U.N. peace-keeping forces into Darfur .  A reporter, who had not been to the Sudan and had earlier written about the imaginary “crimes” the central government carries out in Darfur , was urged by Akbar Muhammad, the coordinator of the press conference, to talk directly to the Sudanese President.  The man declined.  The extent, history, or the roots of the Darfur tragedy, the forces that ignite it, and why, were not of any importance.  Again, no pictures!

Children were not terrified when they saw al-Bashir, who is accused of being “an ugly terrorist, mass murderer, and war criminal”, addressing the convention.  Men and women didn’t walk out to protest a speech delivered by a man described by the American media as “the world’s worse dictator” who is waging a war of “genocide and ethnic cleansing” against Blacks.  On the contrary, the President of Sudan was met with warm applause.  African-Americans of all faiths gave him a standing ovation.

Again!  Why do the U.S. executives of the corporate media insist on keeping al-Bashir and members of his government away from American viewers?  Not a single western newsperson has ever been hurt in the Sudan .

The reason is simple; a picture is worth a thousand words.  The Sudanese President and his entire cabinet, though they are Arabs, are Blacks.  All are Africans.  Arabism is not a race or a blood relationship.  It is a culture, a sense of belonging, history, geography, and a strong desire to unite to survive in a cruel and savage world.  The lie that Arabs are carrying out massacres against Africans would immediately collapse.  The propaganda machine greased by over one hundred and sixty Zionist organizations, in addition to constant falsehoods coming from the White House and Christian Right groups, to convince the world, particularly African-Americans that Arabs murder and discriminate against Blacks, will no longer function.  The millions of dollars spent weekly by the vicious “Save Darfur” campaign on advertisements to vilify and dehumanize Arabs would become meaningless and a waste.

President al-Bashir is not popular here in the United States .  Sudanese rebels, who are trained, financed and equipped, by the U.S. government, hope to soon enter into Sudan far behind U.S. tanks and marines, are occasionally invited to Washington to meet with the U.S. President and Congress.  The legitimate leader of Sudan , who is determined to preserve the unity and sovereignty of his country, and protect its resources for the welfare of his people, is not entitled to receive this “honor”. 

However, Mr. al-Bashir is popular, not only at home, but across Africa , and the Arab and Muslim Worlds.  Africans, Muslims, and Arabs strongly reject the falsehoods, lies, and smear tactics colonial governments manufacture to justify a regime change.  His popularity stems from the fact that he refuses to recognize Israel , an illegitimate foreign identity established on stolen Palestinian land.  He has showed the courage to stand firmly against the crimes committed daily by the U.S. and Israel in Iraq , Palestine , Afghanistan , and Somalia .  He managed to establish excellent relations between the Iraq of Saddam Hussein and Iran , despite the eight year war fueled by the United States .  He protected Sudan ’s wealth and resources from U.S. corporate robbery.

To serve certain political agendas, Mr. al-Bashir is falsely labeled by the Zionist and US corporate media as “a monster, the world’s number one dictator and a war criminal”.  Washington lists Sudan as a terrorist and rogue nation that violates the basic principles of human and civil rights.

I met President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, years ago, twice, in his office in Khartoum .  I was impressed.  I felt most comfortable.  He is one of the few leaders whom I respect and admire.

My late April 2007 visit to the Sudan , in a fact finding mission as a part of an African-American journalists’ delegation, is one of my most memorable experiences. I was moved by the president’s down-to-earth humility.  It gave me the opportunity to meet and visit with him and his family at his private home in his village for several hours, and as a result has enabled me to learn more about him as a family man and as a leader.  The visit also enabled me to closely observe the life style the Arab-African President chose for himself and his family.  It has emphasized and strengthened the notions I had earlier of President al-Bashir and his administration.  I was struck by his overwhelming temperate disposition and manners.  Though he is obviously saddened and concerned about the wars imposed on the Sudan , I was captured by his smile that reflects the inner peace and tranquility he enjoys.

In the last eighteen years, I have visited more than eighty countries throughout the world, and met with many Arab, Muslim, and Third World leaders on three continents.  I must confess, in terms of simplicity and disdain for materialistic lavish life, the leaders of the Sudan , Libya , Iran , and Cuba struck me the most.

Omar Hassan al-Bashir is so attached to his roots and place of his birth and upbringing.  He frequently visits his village where he grew up.  His old small one-storey house in which he stays in and meets some of his local and foreign guests is indistinguishable from any quarters occupied by ordinary citizens.  The house and wall around it are made of mud.  The tiny living room contains two old chairs and an old iron bed used as a sofa.  The narrow passageway that leads to his entry door is nothing but sand.  The food we shared with the President was a piece of chicken, a small roll of bread, an apple and a bottle of water.  Our laps served as the dining room table.  I don’t recall to ever eating something tastier.

I couldn’t believe my eyes.

President al-Bashir came out of his home to a nearby tent, addressed our delegation of 31 African-American journalists, and mingled freely with the men, women and children from the village who flocked to greet him.  He also held his cane up high, and joined them in their traditional dance.

Surprisingly, no bulletproof!  No electronic security check!  No one among the delegates or the crowd was searched.  No villager was pushed away or turned back.

There were no tanks, no armored cars, no Humvees, no Blackhawks, no Apache gunships, and not a single man with a military uniform.

BET (Black Entertainment TV) conducted a one hour exclusive interview with Mr. al-Bashir in his village.  He was thorough, honest, open, and frank.  The question remains: Will BET executives allow this rare interview to be aired in the United States ?  Will they let the truth be heard and their viewers see the facts?  Another question: Will the TV crew who were able to produce a great piece of journalistic work have the courage and determination to stick to their guns, and convince BET to release the documentary they produced to the public?  One would hope and pray that the crew will be true to high journalistic principles and not cave in to intimidation and pressure. 

When the time of al-Asr (before sunset) prayer came, some raggedy rugs were laid on the floor.  President al-Bashir stood shoulder to shoulder, in a straight line, with the other worshippers, irrespective of their position or rank, and solemnly prayed.  He didn’t lead.  A young man in his late twenties did.

The relationship between al-Bashir and God seems to be different from that of Bush and his Lord, who ordered the U.S. President to invade Iraq , and wage a “Crusade” of war against Muslims.  Bush says, “May God Bless America .”  As we see from Bush’s actions, the rest of the world may go to hell.

When the prayer ended, President al-Bashir, with his eyes closed, raised his hands towards the sky, and with a gentle voice, asked God, the creator of the universe, to bless the earth that gives us life.  He called upon the “Merciful and the Beneficent” to bring peace, and may prosperity prevail for the entire world, and to have that His blessings encompass all mankind

http://sundaymag.ca/index.php?id=936

Iraq: US occupation faces crisis of its own making

James Cogan,WSWS

22 February 2008

The much-touted successes of the Bush administration’s deployment of 30,000 American additional troops to Iraq last year rest on unstable and rapidly eroding foundations. The unstated fear in the Pentagon debate over how many American troops can be withdrawn this year is that the policies associated with the surge have created potential triggers for a return to wide-spread resistance.

Three laws passed by the Iraqi parliament on February 13 embody the looming crisis. The legislation consisted of the government’s 2008 budget, an amnesty for thousands of Sunnis who have been detained during counter-insurgency operations and, finally, the definition of the power-sharing arrangements between the federal government in Baghdad and provincial authorities and the naming of October 1 as the date for long-overdue provincial elections. In January, a law was enacted that went some way toward lifting US-imposed restrictions on political activities by former members of the Sunni-dominated Baath Party of former dictator Saddam Hussein.

US ambassador in Iraq Ryan Crocker hailed the bills’ passage as “important steps forward”. The parliament, he declared, “deserves congratulations from all of us”. The truth is that the legislation was accepted only because of intense pressure on a number of major factions in the Iraqi establishment to accept a curtailment of their ambitions. In many cases, political groupings have been compelled to accept policies that fail to meet the guarantees they were given by US officials and officers in exchange for cooperating with the occupation.

The Sunni establishment, which has suffered the greatest losses of power and privilege under US occupation, has been left with an array of grievances. The de-Baathification law still bars former Baathists from holding positions in security ministries. The military and police remain firmly under the influence of the Shiite fundamentalist parties that dominate the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

The amnesty law, which Sunni parties had claimed would free the majority of detainees, only applies to those in Iraqi government facilities—not the more than 20,000 people being held in US-operated prison camps. It also does not cover thousands of men accused of “terrorism” and other charges levelled against Iraqis captured while engaged in armed resistance to the US occupation.

Now, aggravating the sense of betrayal, the provincial election law makes clear that the US authorities and the Shiite-dominated government are offering Sunni factions the role of a side-lined minority at best.

The last provincial elections in 2005 were boycotted by the majority of Sunnis out of sympathy for the insurgency. The low turnout in majority Sunni provinces led to the formation of unrepresentative governments by Shiite parties or Sunni groups that were collaborating with the occupation.

The former insurgent groups that have agreed during the past year to end resistance and join US-backed Awakening Councils demanded that they be represented in the provincial governments before new ballots were held. One reason is their concern that the parties installed in 2005 will use their grip over electoral authorities to rig the vote in October. The provincial law did not meet this concern. It instead proposed that the United Nations—which has little presence in the country, and especially not in the volatile Sunni areas—assist in organising and monitoring the ballot.

The limited character of the concessions to Sunni demands coincides with growing frustration inside the ranks of the Awakening Councils. The primary motive for ending much of the insurgency last year was fear in the Sunni elite and population as a whole over the entrenchment of Shiite fundamentalist power. The bloody Sunni-Shiite civil war that developed throughout 2006 led to mass killings in Sunni areas and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Sunnis from Baghdad and other mixed areas.

In desperation, tribal councils and Baathist-linked insurgent groups in western Iraq and the surrounds of Baghdad accepted US overtures for a deal. In exchange for a ceasefire and substantial bribes, they formed US-financed militias—which now number close to 80,000—to work with American units in hunting down and destroying Islamist groups that continued resistance. American troops prevent Shiite troops, police and militia from entering the areas under the control of the Awakening Councils. In Iraq’s capital, the US military has flung up 12-foot concrete walls around Sunni suburbs to protect them from Shiite militias, establishing little more than ghettos.

The curbing of Sunni attacks on US forces has been a key factor in the substantial drop in American casualties. The collaboration, however, has not led to the hoped-for significant political openings for the Sunni elite or their followers. The Shiite parties view the Awakening Councils as a long-term threat to their power. Maliki has refused demands that the Sunni militias be recruited into the military or police.

The tensions are now surfacing. In Diyala province, the Awakening Council has suspended all cooperation with the occupation and the government over allegations that the local Shiite police are continuing to launch pogroms against Sunnis. Over recent weeks there have been several more incidents in which US troops have allegedly mistaken the militiamen for insurgents and attacked them. A Sunni militia in Babil, close to Baghdad, temporarily suspended all collaboration this week over the US killing of three of its members and two women in separate incidents last Thursday and Friday.

In the western Anbar province, the Awakening Council has issued an ultimatum to the provincial government to resign by April or it will use its 20,000-strong Sunni militia to overthrow it. The government is headed by the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, one of the few Sunni organisations to stand candidates in the 2005 ballot. Only 2 percent of the population of Anbar voted.

Another key aspect of the provincial law only intensifies the prospect of violence over the coming months. The legislation leaves the way open for provinces in other parts of Iraq to form regions with comparable powers to the Kurdish Regional Government in the north (KRG). There is still no oil law to block regions from using clauses of the 2005 US-drafted constitution to claim jurisdiction over the development of new oil and gas fields. In the north, the KRG has proceeded in defiance of opposition in Baghdad to sign contracts with transnational companies for the exploration and opening up of 15 fields.

The main party of the Shiite business and clerical establishment, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), is a strong advocate of regionalism. It will be seeking to gain control of the majority Shiite-populated southern provinces in the October election and pursue its perspective of establishing an oil-rich autonomous region centred on the Shiite religious capital, Najaf. The focus of its efforts will be Basra—the centre of the oil industry—which is currently governed by a Shiite faction which opposes ISCI’s plans.

An ISCI-controlled Shiite regional government is expected to seek to appropriate the bulk of the oil revenues generated by new developments in the south, where more than 60 percent of Iraq’s reserves are located. Shiite regionalism therefore threatens to deprive the elite in both the central Sunni provinces and Baghdad, with its mixed Sunni-Shiite population, of any minor benefits from the planned opening up of Iraq’s vast untapped oil and gas resources to US and other transnational energy corporations.

The centralist tendencies that advocate the concentration of powers in the hands of the Baghdad government include Sunni parties, the alliance headed by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, as well as the Baghdad-based Shiite Sadrist movement and the Basra-based Shiite Islamic Virtue Party. Apart from their rejection of regionalism, these factions agree on little else. They represent rival and, at times, openly hostile tendencies.

They came together, however, to attempt to block the provincial law. The vote for the bill was deadlocked 82-82 and only passed by the speaker’s casting vote. They also combined in an outpouring of resentment against the Kurdish region during the parliamentary sittings. The centralists stridently called for the share of the federal budget paid to the KRG to be reduced from 17 percent to between 14 and 15 percent. While a compromise was reached that agreed to the 17 percent, it stipulated that a census must be held before the next budget to determine what percentage of the population actually lives in the KRG. A majority rejected a Kurdish demand that the Baghdad government pay the wages of the 80,000-strong Kurdish peshmerga militiamen in northern Iraq.

The conflict over regionalism creates two additional flashpoints. Firstly, within the ranks of the Shiite Sadrist movement, there are increasing demands for its leader Moqtada al Sadr to end his opposition to armed resistance to the pro-US government. While the Sadrist Mahdi Army militia generally complied with the “ceasefire” that Sadr announced last August, the US military and ISCI-controlled forces stepped up operations to substantially weaken the Sadrist position in the south ahead of the provincial elections. Hundreds and possibly thousands of Mahdi militiamen have been killed or detained during the surge. More and more dissident groupings are breaking with Sadr in order to fight back.

Over the past several days, US forces in Baghdad have come under stepped-up attack from alleged “rogue” Shiite militiamen. On Monday and Tuesday, Katuysha rockets were fired at American bases in and near the capital, killing at least one civilian contractor and wounding two soldiers.

The second volatile area is the northern oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The opposition in Baghdad toward the Kurdish nationalists’ claims on resources has further poisoned the debate over the holding of a referendum in Kirkuk to determine whether the majority Kurdish population wishes to join the KRG.

The Bush administration pressured the Kurdish leadership last December to accept a delay in the scheduled holding of a vote in order to cement Washington’s own geo-political relations with Turkey, which opposes any strengthening of Kurdish regionalism.

The KRG now faces the likelihood that the Iraqi parliamentary majority will push for the delay to become indefinite. Open warfare over the issue is becoming more likely. Moreover, there are signals that the Turkish government intends to intervene to ensure no vote takes place. The Turkish media reported this week that the plans are being finalised for the deployment of tens of thousands of Turkish troops into northern Iraq during March. While the ostensible reason is to hunt down Kurdish separatists of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the operation will be designed to threaten the KRG into dropping its designs on Kirkuk.

A year after the surge began, disgruntled Sunni, Shiite and, increasingly, Kurdish factions are seething with resentment toward the cynical manipulation and false promises made by the Bush White House and US commander General David Petraeus. The political alienation is intensified by the social catastrophe that continues to afflict the vast majority of the population. For all the talk of “reconstruction”, millions of people lack jobs, clean water, adequate food, fuel, electricity and sewerage. The ebb in the anti-occupation insurgency over the past six months may prove to be short-lived.

www.wsws.org

Kosovo and Muslim solidarity

22/ 02/ 2008

RIA Novosti commentator Maria Appakova

More and more countries are getting ready to recognize Kosovo’s independence, but many are hesitant, including some Arab and Muslim countries despite Washington’s appeals to display solidarity with Kosovo Muslims.During a briefing on Kosovo after its declaration of independence, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns welcomed the recognition of this step by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and hence, by the governments of its member countries. He said: “And we think it is a very positive step that this Muslim state, Muslim majority state, has been created today.”

It’s up to the Europeans to decide whether Burns is right or not, but the U.S. and European media have many apprehensions over the emergence of a Muslim enclave in the heart of Europe that is still predominantly Christian. European self-identification is one of the most sensitive issues. It is being raised over and over again – during debates on the European Constitution, the prospects of Turkey’s admission into the European Union (EU), migration, or the protests after the publication of cartoons of Prophet Muhammad. These debates are a European affair, but Washington is using the Islamic factor to pursue its own ends.

Today, the most urgent issue is whether Kosovo will create a precedent for other territories. This is why many Muslim and other countries do not rush to accept Kosovo’s independence. The United States hoped for Islamic solidarity, but in vain.

Only three OIC members – Turkey, Afghanistan and Senegal – have recognized Kosovo’s independence out of almost 60 members of the organization. Others have adopted a wait-and-see attitude because of the potential threat of a domestic split, or destabilization in neighboring countries.

Let’s name some of the potentially dangerous zones – Iran with Kurdish and Azerbaijani enclaves; Morocco and the Western Sahara problem with the periodic Berber unrest; and Algeria with the same Berber problem. There are sizeable Shiite communities in the Persian Gulf monarchies. Shiites account for 75% of Bahrain’s population; the relevant figure for Saudi Arabia is about 15%, Qatar 11%, and the United Arab Emirates 17%.

Relations between these communities and the government are quite complicated. The situation in Syria is also potentially explosive. The situation only appears stable, but if the central government shows weakness, inter-communal conflicts will instantly flare up. However, events in Lebanon and Iraq are much more dangerous than that.

For the time being, no politician in these conflict-prone zones has loudly expressed readiness to follow Kosovo’s example. This is not because it would not be entirely correct to compare them with Kosovo from the legal and political points of view. Kosovo’s independence is threatening primarily because a decision on it was made without a UN Security Council resolution. It is solely based on the support of the United States and some European countries. In other words, political circumstances have prevailed over international law. Hence, others may follow Kosovo’s example. Success will depend on what Washington wants to achieve. This gives food for thought to those who may follow this example and those who are afraid of separatist attitudes in their own countries.

It is no accident that the Kurds did not follow this path in the first days after Kosovo declared independence, although many analysts and journalists, including those from America and Turkey, have been discussing the Kurdish problem in this context. They are asking why the Kurds are denied what the Kosovars have been given.

The Kurdish problem is very similar to the Kosovo case, but the political situation does not favor the Kurds. For the most part, they live in four countries – Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. No matter how much Washington would like to get at Damascus and Tehran, it will not undermine the interests of Ankara, its long-standing ally and partner. Moreover, the Americans do not even interfere with Turkey’s military operations against the “Kurdish separatists.” As for the Iraqi Kurds, they themselves need U.S. support that guarantees security and brings tangible political and economic benefits. This is why the Kurds are not rushing to follow Kosovo’s scenario, and Ankara has boldly recognized Kosovo’s independence.

Unlike the Kurds, the Palestinians were not silent. Yasser Abd Rabbo, an advisor to head of the Palestinian National Administration Mahmoud Abbas, declared that the Palestinians may follow Kosovo’s example and declare unilateral independence if dialogue with Israel does not produce the desired effect. His statement was instantly refuted by other high-ranking Palestinian politicians, including Abbas himself who favors continuing the talks.

But once again, it does not matter whether the situation in Kosovo is similar to that in the Middle East, although Washington is doing all it can to prove that the Kosovo case is truly unique. Everything is much simpler. Currently, the United States stands for the continuation of Palestinian-Israeli talks and insists on an early declaration of Palestine’s independence. Under different circumstances, the Palestinians will recall the Kosovo case, and will be backed by other Arab and Muslim politicians.

For the time being, most governments are pondering over what will cost them more – recognition of Kosovo’s independence or neutrality.

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080221/99818092.html

« Hystérie préventive » en Israël

Les tiraillements politiques et les polémiques entourant le prochain sommet arabe, prévu fin mars à Damas, ont fait la « Une » de la presse libanaise et arabe.

Les analystes estiment que le sort de ce sommet est désormais lié à l’íssue de la crise libanaise, dont le règlement permettrait l’élection d’un président de la République qui représenterait le Liban lors de cette réunion.

C’est dans ce contexte que le secrétaire général de la Ligue arabe, Amr Moussa, doit débarquer à Beyrouth pour tenter de trouver un compromis, encore incertain, entre le 14-mars pro-US et l’opposition nationale.

Jeudi 21 Février 2008

Tendances et événements au Proche-Orient

« Hystérie préventive » en Israël

Les mesures préventives se poursuivent en Israël dans une ambiance hystérique après les propos du chef de la Résistance libanaise, sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, lors des funérailles du chef militaire du Hezbollah, Imad Mughniyé, tué le 12 février dans un attentat à Damas. Des réservistes ont été partiellement mobilisés et des mesures, habituellement prises en temps de guerre, ont été mises en œuvre à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur du pays. Cet état d’alerte exceptionnel s’accompagne de supputations sur la nature de la riposte du Hezbollah.

Les experts redoutent l’enlèvement ou l’assassinat de hauts responsables israéliens ou l’organisation d’opérations militaires spectaculaires et douloureuses dans les territoires palestiniens. Dans ce contexte, on peut noter les observations suivantes :

 1. L’ attitude d’Israël après l’assassinat d’Imad Mughniyé ne laisse aucun doute sur sa responsabilité, en dépit du démenti officiel de tout lien avec l’attentat de Damas. De toute façon, Israël n’a jamais officiellement reconnu l’implication de ses services de renseignement dans ce genre d’actions.

De toute vraisemblance, l’assassinat est l’œuvre d’une équipe internationale et régionale coordonnée par le responsable du Moyen-Orient au Conseil sécurité nationale états-unien, Elliot Abrams.

Le groupe qui a exécuté l’attentat pourrait comprendre des ressortissants de pays arabes, dirigés par des États-uniens.

Dans ce contexte, il faut se souvenir des réunions des chefs des services de renseignement des États arabes dits « modérés », présidées par la secrétaire d’État Condoleezza Rice, en 2007, en présence d’Abrams.

Selon certaines informations, des dirigeants des SR israéliens auraient pris part à quelques-unes de ces réunions.

 2. Dans le débat sur les conséquences de l’assassinat de Mughniyé, certains analystes israéliens n’hésitent à dire qu’Israël à commis une « stupidité » au vu du prix exorbitants qu’il pourrait payer.

Ces experts adressent notamment leurs critiques au Premier ministre Ehud Olmert et à son ministre de la Défense, Ehud Barak, qui ont donné l’ordre de l’opération. D’autres spécialistes pensent que la riposte du Hezbollah va se limiter à une recrudescence des opérations anti-israéliennes dans les territoires palestiniens et ne va pas comprendre des attaques contre des ressortissants ou des responsables de l’État hébreu à travers le monde.

Les menaces de certains responsables israéliens de lancer une « guerre destructrice » dans la région en cas d’attaque du Hezbollah ont été sévèrement dénoncées. Surtout que la puissance de feu du Hezbollah dans le domaine des roquettes est restée intacte, comme l’a récemment reconnu Ehud Barak.

Le projet de ce dernier de construire un dôme de fer pour protéger Israël des missiles du Hezbollah continue de faire sourire les spécialistes.

 3. Les probabilités d’une attaque terrestre d’envergure contre la Bande de Gaza augmentent, bien que certains milieux israéliens continuent de s’interroger sur la pertinence d’une telle opération au regard des expériences du passé.

Presse et agences internationales

AL KHALEEJ (QUOTIDIEN EMIRATI)
Si on ajoute les tensions dans la rue, au vide institutionnel, au sabotage des institutions, à l’éclatement politique, aux accusations réciproques qui ont atteint les appels au divorce ou au départ, quelle image obtiendra-t-on du Liban qui a souffert, ces dernières décennies, d’une guerre civile et de deux invasions israéliennes dont une a dépassé la capitale Beyrouth ?

AL WATAN (QUOTIDIEN SAOUDIEN)
En décidant de revenir à Beyrouth pour exposer aux loyalistes et à l’opposition son initiative visant à élire à la présidence le général Michel Sleimane, former un gouvernement d’union nationale et élaborer une nouvelle loi électorale plus représentative du peuple libanais, il semble que le secrétaire général de la Ligue arabe, Amr Moussa, rame à contre-courant.

EUROPOLITIQUE (AGENCE DE PRESSE DE L’UNION EUROPEENNE)
Le Conseil de l’Union européenne a adopté, le 18 février, les versions révisées des partenariats d’adhésion de la Turquie et de l’ancienne république yougoslave de Macédoine (ARYM) ainsi que les mises à jour des partenariats avec l’Albanie, la Bosnie-Herzégovine et la Serbie.

LE FIGARO (QUOTIDIEN FRANÇAIS, MAJORITE PARLEMENTAIRE)
L’ancien ministre français des Affaires étrangères, Philippe Douste-Blazy, a été nommé hier par Ban Ki-Moon secrétaire général adjoint de l’Onu chargé des financements innovants ; un poste taillé sur mesure. Douste-Blazy avait été chargé en son temps par Jacques Chirac de mettre en place le fonds Unitaid, de lutte contre les grandes pandémies dans le tiers-monde, en le finançant par une taxe sur les billets d’avion. Au Quai d’Orsay, où Douste-Blazy n’a pas laissé un bon souvenir, on ne cachait pas ce matin son irritation.

24 HEURES (QUOTIDIEN SUISSE)
Le Parti socialiste suisse s’inquiète des nouveaux contrats d’armement signés avec les Émirats arabes unis pour 6,5 millions de francs suisses. En effet, en 2005 les Émirats avaient acheté des chars M109, puis les avaient illégalement revendus au Maroc, alors que la Suisse s’y opposait en raison du conflit du Sahara.

THE TIMES (QUOTIDIEN BRITANNIQUE, GROUPE MURDOCH)
Selon des documents rendus publics hier, le général israélien Doron Almog se trouvait à bord d’un avion d’El-Al ayant fait escale le 11 septembre 2005 à l’aéroport d’Heathrow. Accusé, d’avoir détruit illégalement 59 habitations à Gaza en 2002, il fait l’objet d’un mandat d’arrêt pour crimes de guerre. Cependant, à l’issue d’une confrontation de 2 heures, les autorités britanniques ont renoncé à l’arrêter de peur d’une fusillade avec les officiers de sécurité israéliens embarqués dans l’appareil.

THE AUSTRALIAN (QUOTIDIEN AUSTRALIEN, GROUPE MURDOCH)
Le chef d’état-major des armées australiennes, le général Marshal Houston, a déclaré hier devant une commission d’évaluation du Sénat que le moment été venu pour l’Australie de se retirer d’Irak. Selon lui, l’amélioration de la situation et les progrès accomplis par les forces locales font que la présence australienne n’est plus indispensable.
De son côté, le ministre de la Défense, Joel Fitzgibbon, a indiqué que l’Australie pouvait maintenant s’impliquer plus en Afghanistan.

RIA-NOVOSTI (AGENCE DE PRESSE RUSSE)
• Un porte-parole de la Commission européenne a annoncé que l’Union envisageait d’octroyer 1 milliard d’euros en quatre ans au Kosovo. Le nouvel État a été reconnu par 18 membres de l’Union sur 27.
Alors que le gouvernement grec n’a pas reconnu le Kosovo, il a accepté de participer à la mission de l’Union sur place, suscitant la colère de l’opposition grecque qui l’accuse de duplicité.
Le gouvernement russe maintient sa proposition au Conseil de sécurité à propos du Kosovo. A ses yeux, seule une solution négociée dans le respect des deux parties (serbe et albanophone) peut garantir une paix durable. Le porte-parole du ministère des Affaires étrangères russe a souligné que le déploiement de la mission de l’UE au Kosovo n’a pas de base juridique et contourne le Conseil de sécurité, bref qu’il est « illégal ».
• Ruhama Avraham, ministre israélienne des Relations avec le Parlement, a indiqué avoir entrepris des démarches auprès de la Douma russe pour demander l’aide de Moscou dans la libération de ses trois soldats capturés dans la bande de Gaza et au Liban en 2006.

THE WASHINGTON POST (QUOTIDIEN ÉTATS-UNIEN)
Le gouvernement irakien a donné instruction à sa police de nettoyer les rues des mendiants, des handicapés et des déficients mentaux. Il craint en effet que ceux-ci ne soient utilisés par Al-Qaeda « comme kamikazes à leur insu » (sic).

THE NEW YORK TIMES (QUOTIDIEN ÉTATS-UNIEN)
Intervenant dimanche devant la Conférence des présidents des organisations juives américaines, le Premier ministre israélien Ehud Olmert a affirmé que, d’un commun accord avec la délégation palestinienne, la question de Jérusalem ne serait abordée qu’à la fin des négociations. Interrogé par le journal, le négociateur en chef palestinien, Saëb Erekat, a nié qu’un tel accord ait été conclu entre les deux parties.

TODAY’S ZAMAN (QUOTIDIEN TURC ANGLOPHONE)
L’option d’une opération militaire terrestre de l’armée turque contre les séparatistes kurdes retranchés dans le nord de l’Irak est « sur la table », a déclaré le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Ali Babacan. En général, les opérations militaires contre le PKK dans les régions montagneuses de l’est de la Turquie sont lancées au printemps, après la fonte des neiges. « Le calendrier et les conditions météo sont (des déterminants) importants », a souligné le chef de la diplomatie.

GRANMA (QUOTIDIEN CUBAIN)
 Fidel Castro, leader de la Révolution cubaine
« Je n’aspirerai ni n’accepterai –je répète– je n’aspirerai ni n’accepterai la charge de président du Conseil d’État et de commandant en chef. Ma première obligation après tant d’années de lutte était de préparer le peuple à mon absence, psychologiquement et politiquement. Jamais je n’ai cessé de signaler qu’il s’agissait d’un rétablissement qui n’était pas exempt de risques. Heureusement, notre processus compte encore avec des cadres de la vieille garde, unis à d’autres qui étaient plus jeunes quand a commencé la première étape de la révolution. Le chemin sera difficile et requerra l’effort intelligent de tous. Je ne vous fais pas mes adieux. Je souhaite combattre comme un soldat des idées. »

• Le mouvement de Moqtada Sadr a tempéré les déclarations faites dimanche sur l’annulation d’un accord avec son grand rival au sein de la communauté chiite irakienne, le Conseil suprême islamique d’Irak (CSII), affirmant qu’il s’agissait d’un « avertissement ». « Les déclarations du mouvement sadriste ne signifient pas l’annulation de l’accord entre les deux parties, mais c’est un avertissement au Conseil suprême », a affirmé Salah al-Obeidi, le porte-parole du bureau de Moqtada Sadr à Najaf. « Si le CSII ne fait rien pour régler les problèmes entre les deux parties, nous les mettons en garde contre les conséquences », a ajouté M. Obeidi.

• En Irak, deux Saoudiens et un Algérien, membres d’el-Qaëda, ont été tués mardi avant l’aube par les forces spéciales irakiennes près de Samarra, dans le nord de l’Irak, a indiqué un officier de ces forces. Les forces spéciales ont arrêté un chef local d’el-Qaëda, Mahmoud al-Rahmani, lors d’une opération contre la cache de l’organisation dans le quartier industriel de Samarra, d’après le lieutenant Mouthanna Chakir Mahmoud. Son interrogatoire a mené les forces spéciales à une deuxième cache, dans les faubourgs de Samarra, où les forces spéciales ont engagé des combats avec les deux Saoudiens et l’Algérien, qui ont été tués, a ajouté le lieutenant. D’importantes quantités d’armes – dont des roquettes et des bombes– ont été découvertes dans les deux caches, a-t-il précisé. En outre, un père de famille, sa femme, son fils ainsi qu’une voisine, participant à la lutte contre les affiliés d’el-Qaëda, ont été tués par l’organisation extrémiste près de Baaqouba. Selon des membres du village et de la famille, la famille avait rejoint récemment les « comités populaires », appelés également les « Forces du réveil ».

• Le chef de la diplomatie égyptienne Ahmad Aboul Gheit a chargé l’un de ses adjoints de convoquer l’ambassadeur du Danemark au Caire pour lui affirmer que l’Égypte jugeait inacceptables les tentatives des médias danois de répéter l’offense portée aux sentiments et aux symboles sacrés des musulmans dans le monde entier, selon le porte-parole du ministère des Affaires étrangères, Hossam Zaki.

• Le Conseil des gardiens de la Constitution iranienne, chargé de superviser les élections, a repêché 251 nouveaux candidats qui avaient été disqualifiés pour les législatives du 14 mars, a rapporté le site officiel du ministère de l’Intérieur. Le 22 février « est le dernier délai pour le Conseil des gardiens pour publier la liste des candidats approuvés », a déclaré Abbas-Ali Kadkhodaie, porte-parole du Conseil, cité sur le site Internet du ministère de l’Intérieur. « Nous sommes en train d’examiner les plaintes et nous allons publier les résultats le 3 du mois iranien d’esfand », qui correspond au 22 février.
Ensuite, les candidats disqualifiés disposeront d’un dernier recours devant le même Conseil. Le Conseil des gardiens, contrôlé par les conservateurs et chargé d’approuver la liste définitive des candidats, a repêché à ce jour 831 candidats sur un total de 2200 disqualifiés par les instances subalternes. « Sur les 251 candidats repêchés, il y a une dizaine de réformateurs approuvés », a déclaré Hossein Marashi, vice-président de l’état-major de la coalition des réformateurs, qui regroupe 30 partis et mouvements politiques.

Tendances et événements au Liban

Amr Moussa réussira-t-il une percée entre le 14-mars et l’opposition ?

À la veille de la nouvelle phase de l’initiative arabe, que devait inaugurer ce mercredi Hicham Youssef, l’adjoint du secrétaire général de la Ligue arabe Amr Moussa, des indices contradictoires sont apparus quant à l’orientation que pourrait prendre la crise libanaise :
 1. Des informations ont indiqué que lors de sa tournée dans certaines capitales arabes et occidentales, le chef de la diplomatie saoudienne, le prince Saoud al-Fayçal, a plaidé en faveur de l’ínternationalisation de la présidentielle libanaise en transférant le dossier de la Ligue arabe au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies. Mais les pays européens participants à la Finul ainsi que la Russie ont informé le ministre des Affaires étrangères wahhabite de leur refus d’une telle option. Moscou aurait même informé al-Fayçal qu’íl est peu probable qu’une nouvelle résolution soit votée en Conseil de sécurité dans le but d’accroitre les pressions sur la Syrie.

 2. Amr Moussa et le président de la Chambre, Nabih Berry, sont en contact permanent pour coordonner leurs efforts afin de faire réussir la réunion, annoncée par Moussa, entre le général Michel Aoun et Saad HaririSaad-Hariri-Profile Sep-07 , dimanche prochain. Un projet de solution à la crise serait en gestation et reste entouré de secret, afin d’éviter qu’il ne soit torpillé par les faucons du 14-mars.

 3. Les efforts déployés par des parties étrangères pour tenter de régler la crise se heurtent à l’intransigeance des Etats-Unis et de l’Arabie saoudite. Une source dirigeante de l’opposition a estimé que les déclarations du diplomate US David Satterfield, qui a tournée en dérision l’initiative arabe, l’appel de Riyad à ses ressortissants à éviter le Liban, ainsi que la décision de la France de fermer deux de ses centres culturels à Tripoli (Liban-Nord) et Saïda (Liban-Sud), constituent des messages à connotation sécuritaire et politique. Leur résultat est d’amplifier les craintes des Libanais sur l’existence d’un plan arabe orchestré par Washington pour provoquer une explosion de la situation au Liban et empêcher toute entente entre le 14-mars et l’opposition.

 4. Des informations de presse en provenance de Paris évoquent un prochain retour de l’ambassadeur Jean-Claude Cousseran au Liban et dans d’autres capitales, en sa qualité d’émissaire présidentiel, cette fois-ci. Dans ce cadre, des divergences semblent exister sur l’approche à adopter dans la crise libanaise entre le Quai d’Orsay et l’Élysée.

 5. Face à la gravité de la situation sur le terrain, l’Armée libanaise a procédé à un déploiement massif dans quelque 30 points chauds de la capitale. Mais le commandement de l’armée ne se fait pas d’illusion sur les limites de ses capacités à faire face à des débordements de grande ampleur, consciente du fait que la sécurité est avant tout une question politique.

 6. Autre grand rendez-vous de cette semaine, le discours que doit prononcer le chef du Hezbollah, sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, vendredi, à l’occasion d’une cérémonie organisée pour les grands martyrs de la Résistance, tous assassinés par les Israéliens (Ragheb Harb, Abbas Moussaoui et Imad Mughniyé). Dans ce cadre, des informations font état de progrès dans l’enquête sur l’assassinat de Mughniyé et les analystes estiment que cet attentat pourrait constituer le prélude à une guerre régionale lancée contre le Liban, la Syrie et Gaza, avec une couverture des arabes dits « modérés ».

 7. La campagne médiatique saoudienne contre la Syrie et le Hezbollah se poursuit à travers des journaux et des chaines satellitaires financés par le royaume wahhabite.

Déclarations

 FOUAD SINIORA, PREMIER MINISTRE (14-MARS)
« Les Libanais ont une nouvelle fois plébiscité le 14 Mars, exprimant leur refus de la guerre et des conflits internes, et soutenant l’initiative arabe. Nos concitoyens veulent vivre dans un État qui respecte la dignité humaine et non pas dans une myriade de mini-États où l’on brûle des pneus et où l’on exploite les questions sociales pour d’autres fins. Lors de la dernière guerre israélienne contre le Liban, toutes les parties, notamment sayyed Hassan Nasrallah et le président Berry, ont soutenu le plan en sept points du gouvernement qui réclame la libération des fermes de Chebaa et stipule clairement que le Liban sera le dernier pays à conclure un accord de paix avec Israël. Mais il est inadmissible que les Libanais soient astreints à payer le prix de l’ensemble du conflit israélo-arabe, d’autant qu’ils ont subi sept invasions israéliennes au cours des trente dernières années (…) Certaines parties exigent que le prochain cabinet soit formé selon la règle des 10+10+10. Mais l’un des principaux acquis de Taëf est le principe de l’égalité. Il ne faudrait donc pas introduire de nouveaux éléments qui pourraient mener à l’anéantissement du principe de l’équité et à l’instauration de la règle des trois-tiers que refusent les Libanais. »

 CHEIKH ABDEL AMIR KABALAN, HAUT DIGNITAIRE RELIGIEUX CHIITE
« O Imad (Mughniyé, ndlr), toi et tes camarades nous avez relevé la tête. Imad, tu n’es pas mort. Ceux qui ont comploté contre toi sont morts. Israël est dans une situation de panique. Son armée est en état d’alerte et il vit l’angoisse des conséquences néfastes de l’assassinat sur ses ambassades à l’étranger et ses soldats à l’intérieur. Ils ont voulu faire la guerre et nous, nous ne commençons pas les guerres. Si vous voulez la guerre, nous vous disons bienvenue, nous serons tous des Imad Mughniyé. Nous, au Liban, portons les armes uniquement contre Israël. Mais avec nos frères libanais, nous agirons selon le précepte de Issa fils de Marie (Jésus-Christ) : “Qui vous frappe sur la joue droite, tendez-lui la joue gauche” ». Nous tous, avec mes frères du Hezbollah et d’Amal, nous resterons libanais avant tout. Nous sommes fiers de notre identité libanaise. »

 OMAR KARAME, ANCIEN PREMIER MINISTRE (OPPOSITION)
« L’opposition est attachée à la paix civile et les derniers propos de David Satterfield, la semaine dernière, révèlent d’une manière flagrante la volonté des loyalistes de ne pas parvenir à un règlement de la crise. »

 AMINE GEMAYEL, ANCIEN PRESIDNT DE LA REPUBLIQUE (14-MARS)
« La crispation politique qui a précédé le retour de Amr Moussa n’est pas un signe encourageant quant au dénouement de la crise. L’opposition n’est pas prête à conclure un accord lors de la dernière visite de l’émissaire de la Ligue, vu qu’elle a refusé toutes les offres qui lui ont été présentées, insistant sur un panier complet. Ceci démontre que l’opposition s’est retournée contre la Constitution, contre Taëf pour instaurer de nouvelles coutumes sur la scène politique. Les propos de sayyed Hassan Nasrallah sur la guerre ouverte contre Israël marquent l’avènement d’une nouvelle phase. À quel point un chef de parti peut-il imposer des orientations stratégiques au pays sans revenir aux institutions constitutionnelles ? ».

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What would it take to launch a war with Iran?

By Bruce RamseySeattle Times editorial columnist

Iraq should have cured President George W. Bush of any further itch for starting a war. And yet there comes a rumble for an attack on Iran. Opposing this, the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation sends out emissaries, several of whom visited The Seattle Times.

Among them was Brig. Gen. John H. Johns (ret.), who was assistant commander of the 1st Infantry Division and a lecturer at the Army War College. Like other generals, Johns opposed the invasion of Iraq, and he now opposes an attack on Iran.

Is such an attack possible? It is Bush’s last year in office. There is no time for a land war, and anyway, says Johns, “We don’t have the ground troops to do it.” But an air war is possible. Johns says it might destroy 1,200 to 1,600 targets.

Johns is not a spokesman for the government. Whether that makes him less credible will depend on your point of view. He lives near Washington, D.C., and socializes with retired generals and CIA officers and others from the security world. He speaks on behalf of a peace group. Take that for what it is worth.

Here is what he says: Last year, there was a push in the administration for an air war against Iran. The given reason was Iran’s plan to build an A-bomb. Then came the National Intelligence Estimate that said Iran had given up on it five years ago.

Says Johns, “The intelligence community intended that to be public to lessen the president’s chance of going to war. They wanted to avoid being complicit in another war. That’s the story I get.”

Johns says a struggle is under way in Washington, D.C. Those opposed to an attack include Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those wanting an attack, he says, are the deputy national-security adviser for global democracy strategy, Elliott Abrams; Vice President Dick Cheney, “and the hard-line Israel lobby.”

Bombing Iraq is how Israel scotched Saddam Hussein’s A-bomb, in 1981. Israel is much admired for that, but preventive air attack is a high-risk strategy. It stirs hatred, and it has a large downside if it fails.

Diplomacy is lower-risk, especially if there is time for it. Johns goes further, arguing against an attack even if diplomacy fails. “Even if Iran got nuclear weapons,” he says, “they’re not going to commit suicide by using them.”

There may be other pretexts for war. On Jan. 6 came an incident of Iranian speedboats zipping around U.S. Navy ships in a provocative way. It could have been another Gulf of Tonkin incident.

What would it take to have a war with Iran? Stephen Kinzer, a former New York Times correspondent and author of “All the Shah’s Men” (2003), was also part of the peace delegation here. He says it might just take a decision. “The possibility of an attack is real,” he says, and notes that President Bush would not need a vote of Congress.

Air attack is an act of war. At least, Americans thought so in 1941. But despite the Constitution granting the war power to Congress, in Vietnam (1964), Kuwait (1990) and Iraq (2002) our presidents have asked Congress for permission to make war only when they expected major fighting on the ground. Even to invade Iraq, George W. Bush said he did not need permission and asked for it only after Congress, and the public, raised an outcry.

In 1999, President Clinton conducted a 78-day air war against Serbia even though the House deadlocked 213-213 on a resolution supporting it, and the Senate never voted at all. Clinton didn’t care; his position was that he didn’t need permission for an air war.

What matters is not only the Constitution; it is the outcry. Government does what it can get away with — and in the last year of the Bush presidency, it is still an open question how much that is.

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/bruceramsey/2004190453_rams20.html